Abstract.
This paper focuses on group normative procedures and distributional norms that are utilized in functioning groups in the production/generation of normative equilibria, that is, the major basis of social order in groups and communities. The group is an organizational arrangement with some degree of division of labor and characterized by group purposes and goals, a normative order and patterns of interaction and output. We identified three patterns of particular interest: (1) legitimation procedures in groups to resolve conflicts and make collective choices; (2) patterns of just outcomes satisfying the normatively prescribed group outcomes/outputs of a principle of distributive justice’s; (3) normative equilibria, which are group patterns of interaction or collective decision that tend to stability because they satisfy or realize one or more key group norms.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
- 1.
The theory of fair division among a group of individuals was initiated in the 1940s by three Polish mathematicians: Hugo Steinhaus, Bronisław Knaster and Stefan Banach. Brams and Taylor [2] give a historical introduction of fair division and provide a detailed discussion of many procedures.
References
Brams, S.J., Edelman, P.H., Fishburn, P.C.: Paradoxes of Fair Division. Economic Research Reports C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics Department of Economics Faculty of Arts and Science New York University. New York University, New York (2000)
Brams, S.J., Taylor, A.D.: Fair Division: From Cake-cutting to Dispute Resolution. Cambridge University Press, New York (1996)
Burns, T.R., Caldas, J.C., Roszkowska, E.: Generalized game theory’s contribution to multi-agent modelling: addressing problems of social regulation, social order, and effective security. In: Dunin-Keplicz, B., et al. (eds.) Monitoring, Security and Rescue Techniques in Multiagent Systems. Springer, Berlin (2005)
Burns, T.R., Corte, U., Machado, N.: Toward a Universal Theory of the Human Group: Sociological Systems Framework Applied to the Comparative Analysis of Groups and Organizations. CIES/ISCTE WP, Lisbon (2014)
Burns, T.R., Flam, H.: The Shaping of Social Organization: Social Rule System Theory with Applications. Sage Publications, London (1987)
Burns, T.R., Gomolińska, A.: The theory of socially embedded games: the mathematics of social relationships, rule complexes, and action modalities. Qual. Quant. Int. J. Methodol. 34(4), 379–406 (2000)
Burns, T., Machado, N., Roszkowska, E.: Distributive justice: from steinhaus, knaster, and banach to elster and rawls: the perspective of sociological game theory. Stud. Log. Gramm. Rhetoric 37(50), 11–38 (2014)
Burns, T., Roszkowska, E.: A social procedural approach to the pareto optimization problematique: part I: pareto optimization and its limitations versus the GGT conception of the solution of multi-value conflict problems through societal procedures. Qual. Quant. 43(5), 781–803 (2009)
Burns, T., Roszkowska, E.: A social procedural approach to the pareto optimization problematique: part II. institutionalized procedures and their limitation. Qual. Quant. 43(5), 805–832 (2009)
Burns, T.R., Roszkowska, E.: Fuzzy games and equilibria: the perspective of the general theory of games on nash and normative equilibria. In: Pal, S.K., Polkowski, L., Skowron, A. (eds.) Rough-Neural Computing. Techniques for Computing with Words, pp. 435–470. Springer-Verlag, Berlin (2004)
Burns, T.R., Roszkowska, E.: Social judgment in multi-agent systems: the perspective of generalized game theory. In: Sun, Ron (ed.) Cognition and Multi-agent Interaction. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (2005)
Burns, T.R., Roszkowska, E.: Multi-value decision-making and games: the perspective of generalized game theory on social and psychological complexity, contradiction, and equilibrium. In: Shi, Y. (ed.) Advances in Multiple Criteria Decision Making and Human Systems Management. IOS Press, Amsterdam (2007)
Chapman, B.: Law games: defeasible rules and revisable rationality. Law Philos. 17, 443–480 (1998)
Chapman, B.: More easily done than said: rules, reasons and rational social choice. Oxf. J. Leg. Stud. 18, 293–329 (1998)
Elster, J.: Fairness and norms. Soc. Res. 73(2), 365–376 (2006)
Gomolińska, A.: Rule complexes for representing social actors and interactions. Stud. Logic Gramm. Rhetoric 3(16), 95–108 (1999)
Gomoliska, A.: Fundamental mathematical notions of the theory of socially embedded games: a granular computing perspective. In: Pal, S.K., Polkowski, L., Skowron, A. (eds.) Rough-Neural Computing: Techniques for Computing with Words, pp. 411–434. Springer-Verlag, Berlin (2004)
Keeney, R.L.: Foundations for group decision analysis. Decis. Anal. 10(2), 103–120 (2014)
Roszkowska, E., Burns, T.: Fuzzy bargaining games: conditions of agreement satisfaction equilibrium. Group Decis. Negot. 19(5), 421–440 (2010)
Rawls, J.: A Theory of Justice. Belknap Press, Cambridge (1971)
Steinhaus, H.: The problem of fair division. Econometrica 16, 101–104 (1948)
Acknowledgements.
This research was supported by the grant from Polish National Science Centre (DEC-2011/03/B/HS4/03857).
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2015 Springer International Publishing Switzerland
About this paper
Cite this paper
Burns, T., Machado, N., Roszkowska, E. (2015). Distributive Justice, Legitimizing Collective Choice Procedures, and the Production of Normative Equilibria in Social Groups: Towards a Theory of Social Order. In: Kamiński, B., Kersten, G., Szapiro, T. (eds) Outlooks and Insights on Group Decision and Negotiation. GDN 2015. Lecture Notes in Business Information Processing, vol 218. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-19515-5_7
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-19515-5_7
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-19514-8
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-19515-5
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)