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Generic Transformation to Strongly Existentially Unforgeable Signature Schemes with Continuous Leakage Resiliency

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Information Security and Privacy (ACISP 2015)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 9144))

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Abstract

In ProvSec 2014, Wang and Tanaka proposed a transformation which converts weakly existentially unforgeable (wEUF) signature schemes into strongly existentially unforgeable (sEUF) ones in the bounded leakage model. To obtain the construction, they combined the leakage resilient (LR) chameleon hash functions with the Generalised Boneh-Shen-Waters (GBSW) transformation proposed by Steinfeld, Pieprzyk, and Wang. However, their transformation cannot be used in a more realistic model called continual leakage model since the secret key of the LR chameleon hash functions cannot be updated.

In this paper, we propose a transformation which can convert wEUF signature schemes into sEUF ones in the continual leakage model. To achieve our goal, we give a new definition of continuous leakage resilient (CLR) chameleon hash function and construct it based on the CLR signature scheme proposed by Malkin, Teranishi, Vahlis, and Yung. Although the CLR chameleon hash functions satisfy the property of strong collision-resistance, because of the existence of the updating algorithm, an adversary may find the kind of collisions such that messages are the same but randomizers are different. From this fact, we cannot combine our chameleon hash functions with the GBSW transformation directly, or the sEUF security of the transformed signature schemes cannot be achieved. To solve this problem, we improve the original GBSW transformation by making use of the Groth-Sahai proof system and then combine it with our CLR chameleon hash functions.

Department of Mathematical and Computing Sciences, Graduate School of Information Science and Engineering, Tokyo Institute of Technology, and CREST, JST, W8-55, 2-12-1 Ookayama, Meguro-ku, Tokyo 152-8552, Japan. Supported by the Ministry of Education, Science, Sports and Culture, Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (A) No.24240001 and (C) No.23500010, a grant of I-System Co. Ltd., and NTT Secure Platform Laboratories.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Tokyo Institute of Technology, Tokyo, Japan

    Yuyu Wang & Keisuke Tanaka

Authors
  1. Yuyu Wang
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  2. Keisuke Tanaka
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Correspondence to Yuyu Wang .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, Queensland, Australia

    Ernest Foo

  2. Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, Queensland, Australia

    Douglas Stebila

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Wang, Y., Tanaka, K. (2015). Generic Transformation to Strongly Existentially Unforgeable Signature Schemes with Continuous Leakage Resiliency. In: Foo, E., Stebila, D. (eds) Information Security and Privacy. ACISP 2015. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9144. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-19962-7_13

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-19962-7_13

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