Abstract
Infective countermeasures have been shown to be the most efficient way to prevent fault attacks which are one of the most effective side-channel attacks on symmetric key ciphers. However, none of the countermeasures have been found to last in terms of security. Battistello et al. [1] has broken the last two surviving infective methods against fault attacks on AES and emphasized on the need of a better security framework for fault attack countermeasures. The current work is the first such step towards achieving the design of a secure infective countermeasure as suggested by [1]. We develop a theoretical framework based on fault randomization to formalize the infective approach used in fault attack countermeasures. On the basis of this formalization, a new infective countermeasure is proposed which employs a randomized non-linear mixing coupled with a linear diffusion function. A case study on AES with a practical construction of the countermeasure is presented. The full design is implemented on Xilinx SPARTAN-3 FPGA platform and compared favorably with a related scheme in literature.
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Ghosh, S., Saha, D., Sengupta, A., Roy Chowdhury, D. (2015). Preventing Fault Attacks Using Fault Randomization with a Case Study on AES. In: Foo, E., Stebila, D. (eds) Information Security and Privacy. ACISP 2015. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9144. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-19962-7_20
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-19962-7_20
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