Abstract
Many identity-based encryption schemes under the \(k\)-LIN assumption contain \(2k+1\) group elements in the ciphertext overhead and private keys. In this paper,
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We push the limit further by constructing an IBE scheme under the \(k\)-LIN assumption with \(2k\) group elements in the ciphertext overhead and private keys.
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Our technique additionally expands to the scheme of Boneh, Raghunathan, and Segev (CRYPTO 2013) to yield more efficient function-private IBE under the DLIN assumption.
The shortened size inherently leads to less exponentiations and pairings in encryption and decryption, and hence yielding schemes with better computational efficiency under \(k\)-LIN.
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Kurosawa, K., Phong, L.T. (2015). IBE Under \(k\)-LIN with Shorter Ciphertexts and Private Keys. In: Foo, E., Stebila, D. (eds) Information Security and Privacy. ACISP 2015. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9144. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-19962-7_9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-19962-7_9
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