Abstract
In Axelrod norm models (Axelrod, 1986), the existence of a norm is described in terms of two variables, namely Boldness and Vengefulness. This tradition operates on the assumption that these two variables are independent. In this paper we seek to investigate behavior when this assumption is violated. In particular, we postulate a linear negative relationship between the two. We find that in such a world, norm establishment is possible without a Metanorm. Further we prove that this state is an Evolutionary Stable State (ESS). Finally, we explore the role of initial states in bringing about varied behavior in the presence of multiple ESSs.
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Katiyar, V., Clarance, D. (2015). Norm Establishment in a Single Dimension Axelrod Model. In: Chen, Q., Torroni, P., Villata, S., Hsu, J., Omicini, A. (eds) PRIMA 2015: Principles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems. PRIMA 2015. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9387. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-25524-8_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-25524-8_3
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