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SPEMS: A Stealthy and Practical Execution Monitoring System Based on VMI

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Cloud Computing and Security (ICCCS 2015)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNISA,volume 9483))

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Abstract

Dynamic analyzing has been proposed for over decades to tracing the execution of programs. However, most of them need an agent installed inside the execution environment, which is easy to be detected and bypassed. To solve the problem, we proposed a system named SPEMS which utilized virtual machine introspection (VMI) technology to stealthily monitor the execution of programs inside virtual machines. SPEMS integrates and improves multiple open-source software tools. By inspecting the whole process of sample preparation, execution tracing and analysis, it is able to be applied in large scale program monitoring, malware analyzing and memory forensics. Experiments results show our system has remarkable performance improvement compared with former works.

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Correspondence to Jiangyong Shi .

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Shi, J., Yang, Y., Li, C., Wang, X. (2015). SPEMS: A Stealthy and Practical Execution Monitoring System Based on VMI. In: Huang, Z., Sun, X., Luo, J., Wang, J. (eds) Cloud Computing and Security. ICCCS 2015. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9483. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-27051-7_32

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-27051-7_32

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