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Effects of Profit Taxes in Matrix Games

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Operations Research Proceedings 2014

Part of the book series: Operations Research Proceedings ((ORP))

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Abstract

It is consensus in different fields of practical relevance that the introduction of taxes will—in one way or the other—affect the playing behavior of actors. However, it is not clear what the effects might really look like. Here, a game theoretic model is considered that concentrates on effects of relative or constant taxes on transferred monetary volume. For matrix games it is asked: How do taxes change the behavior of players and the expected transacted volume? Analyzing this basic research model clearly shows: One has to be careful in considering taxes as a powerful instrument to confine aggressive playing behavior. Taxes might encourage increased expected transfers.

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References

  1. Althöfer, I., Bärthel, M.: On taxed matrix games and changes in the expected transfer. Game Theory. Hindawi (2014). http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2014/435092

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Acknowledgments

Special thanks go to Ingo Althöfer, who gave his time for discussions and proofreading. I thank Rahul Savani for his nice online bimatrix solver (http://banach.lse.ac.uk/form.html).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Mathematics, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Ernst-Abbe-Platz 2, 07743, Jena, Germany

    Marlis Bärthel

Authors
  1. Marlis Bärthel
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Correspondence to Marlis Bärthel .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Operations Research, RWTH Aachen University, Aachen, Germany

    Marco Lübbecke

  2. Lehrstuhl II für Mathematik, RWTH Aachen University, Aachen, Germany

    Arie Koster

  3. RWTH Aachen University, Aachen, Nordrhein-Westfalen, Germany

    Peter Letmathe

  4. E.ON Energy Research Center, RWTH Aachen University, Aachen, Nordrhein-Westfalen, Germany

    Reinhard Madlener

  5. Management Science, RWTH Aachen University, Aachen, Nordrhein-Westfalen, Germany

    Britta Peis

  6. Chair of Operations Management, RWTH Aachen University, Aachen, Germany

    Grit Walther

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© 2016 Springer International Publishing Switzerland

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Bärthel, M. (2016). Effects of Profit Taxes in Matrix Games. In: Lübbecke, M., Koster, A., Letmathe, P., Madlener, R., Peis, B., Walther, G. (eds) Operations Research Proceedings 2014. Operations Research Proceedings. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-28697-6_12

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