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Composable Bounds on Information Flow from Distribution Differences

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Data Privacy Management, and Security Assurance (DPM 2015, QASA 2015)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 9481))

Abstract

We define information leakage in terms of a “difference” between the a priori distribution over some remote behavior and the a posteriori distribution of the remote behavior conditioned on a local observation from a protocol run. Either a maximum or an average may be used. We identify a set of notions of “difference;” we show that they reduce our general leakage notion to various definitions in the literature. We also prove general composability theorems analogous to the data-processing inequality for mutual information, or cascading channels for channel capacities.

Copyright \(\copyright \) 2015 The MITRE Corporation. All rights reserved.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    There is an alterative definition for conditional min-entropy [1, 2, 10, 14]. We will not be dealing with this alternative definition here.

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Acknowledgments

We are grateful to Chris Eliopoulos Alicea, Joseph J. Ferraro, Vineet Mehta, Paul D. Rowe, John D. Ramsdell, Joe J. Rushanan, and the reviewers of this paper for helpful comments.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. The MITRE Corporation, Bedford, USA

    Megumi Ando & Joshua D. Guttman

Authors
  1. Megumi Ando
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  2. Joshua D. Guttman
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Megumi Ando .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Telecom SudParis, Evry, France

    Joaquin Garcia-Alfaro

  2. Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Bellaterra, Spain

    Guillermo Navarro-Arribas

  3. University of Urbino, Urbino, Italy

    Alessandro Aldini

  4. National Research Council - C.N.R., Pisa, Italy

    Fabio Martinelli

  5. Department of Computer Science, TU Darmstadt, Darmstadt, Germany

    Neeraj Suri

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Ando, M., Guttman, J.D. (2016). Composable Bounds on Information Flow from Distribution Differences. In: Garcia-Alfaro, J., Navarro-Arribas, G., Aldini, A., Martinelli, F., Suri, N. (eds) Data Privacy Management, and Security Assurance. DPM QASA 2015 2015. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9481. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-29883-2_2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-29883-2_2

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-29882-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-29883-2

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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