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Survey of Distance Bounding Protocols and Threats

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Foundations and Practice of Security (FPS 2015)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 9482))

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Abstract

NFC and RFID are technologies that are more and more present in our life. These technologies allow a tag to communicate without contact with a reader. In wireless communication an intruder can always listen and forward a signal, so he can mount a so-called worm hole attack. In the last decades, several Distance Bounding (DB) protocols have been introduced to avoid such attacks. In this context, there exist several threat models: Terrorist Fraud, Mafia Fraud, Distance Fraud etc. We first show the links between the existing threat models. Then we list more than forty DB protocols and give the bounds of the best known attacks for different threat models. In some cases, we explain how we are able to improve existing attacks. Then, we present some advices to the designers of the DB protocols and to the intruders to mount some attacks.

P. Lafourcade—This research was conducted with the support of the “Digital trust” Chair from the University of Auvergne Foundation.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    ppt. ITM is for polynomial probabilistic time Interactive Turing Machine.

  2. 2.

    Definition 3 defines MiM attack as using a honest P(x). Here, the definition use \(P^*(x)\).

  3. 3.

    Most of the papers are avaible at http://www.avoine.net/rfid/.

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Correspondence to Pascal Lafourcade .

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Brelurut, A., Gerault, D., Lafourcade, P. (2016). Survey of Distance Bounding Protocols and Threats. In: Garcia-Alfaro, J., Kranakis, E., Bonfante, G. (eds) Foundations and Practice of Security. FPS 2015. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9482. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-30303-1_3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-30303-1_3

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