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Computational Soundness of Uniformity Properties for Multi-party Computation Based on LSSS

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Trusted Systems (INTRUST 2015)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 9565))

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Abstract

We provide a symbolic model for multi-party computation based on linear secret-sharing scheme, and prove that this model is computationally sound: if there is an attack in the computational world, then there is an attack in the symbolic (abstract) model. Our original contribution is that we deal with the uniformity properties, which cannot be described using a single execution trace, while considering an unbounded number of sessions of the protocols in the presence of active and adaptive adversaries.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Kyushu University, 744 Motooka, Nishi-ku, Fukuoka, 819-0395, Japan

    Hui Zhao & Kouichi Sakurai

  2. Shandong University of Technology, Zibo, 255000, Shandong, China

    Hui Zhao

Authors
  1. Hui Zhao
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  2. Kouichi Sakurai
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Hui Zhao .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Computer Science, Columbia University, New York, New York, USA

    Moti Yung

  2. Key Laboratory of Trusted Computing, Beijing University of Technology, Beijing, China

    Jianbiao Zhang

  3. Key Laboratory of Trusted Computing, Beijing University of Technology, Beijing, China

    Zhen Yang

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Zhao, H., Sakurai, K. (2016). Computational Soundness of Uniformity Properties for Multi-party Computation Based on LSSS. In: Yung, M., Zhang, J., Yang, Z. (eds) Trusted Systems. INTRUST 2015. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9565. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31550-8_7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31550-8_7

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-31549-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-31550-8

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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