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Constructing Efficient PAKE Protocols from Identity-Based KEM/DEM

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Information Security Applications (WISA 2015)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 9503))

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Abstract

In this paper, we propose an efficient identity-based password authenticated key exchange (IBPAKE) protocol using identity-based KEM/DEM. In IBPAKE, a client conducts authentication based on a human-memorable password and a server’s identity. A distinctive feature of IBPAKE protocols, compared to the well-known EKE-like PAKE protocols, is that an adversary who even acquired a user’s password cannot impersonate a server to further investigate user’s sensitive information.

We first construct the new IBPAKE protocol using the Boneh-Franklin identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme, and then generalize the protocol by presenting a generic method to yield an efficient IBPAKE protocol from identity-based KEM/DEM. Our fine-grained approach has concrete advantages in terms of performance. First, unnecessary parameters can be removed easily. This allows a straightforward improvement on computational cost and communication bandwidth. Our protocol gives better performance, compared to previously known IBPAKE protocols.

J.Y. Hwang—This work was supported by the ICT R and D program of MSIP/IITP [B1206-15-1007, Development of Universal Authentication Platform Technology with Context-Aware Multi-Factor Authentication and Digital Signature].

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Notes

  1. 1.

    For example, each client must verify a server’s certificate (e.g., X.509 Certificates) via CRL (Certificate Revocation Lists) or OCSP (Online Certificate Status Protocol).

  2. 2.

    For the security of full adaptive identity attack, refer to the full version of this paper.

  3. 3.

    To the best of our knowledge, this is the only protocol with provable security.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Network and Security Lab, Samsung SDS, Inc., Seoul, Korea

    Kyu Young Choi & Jihoon Cho

  2. Authentication Research Section, ETRI, Daejeon, Korea

    Jung Yeon Hwang

  3. Graduate School of Information, Yonsei University, Seoul, Korea

    Taekyoung Kwon

Authors
  1. Kyu Young Choi
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  2. Jihoon Cho
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  3. Jung Yeon Hwang
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  4. Taekyoung Kwon
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Jung Yeon Hwang .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Pusan National University, Busan, Korea (Republic of)

    Ho-won Kim

  2. Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute, Daejeon, Korea (Republic of)

    Dooho Choi

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Choi, K.Y., Cho, J., Hwang, J.Y., Kwon, T. (2016). Constructing Efficient PAKE Protocols from Identity-Based KEM/DEM. In: Kim, Hw., Choi, D. (eds) Information Security Applications. WISA 2015. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9503. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31875-2_34

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31875-2_34

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-31874-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-31875-2

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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