Abstract
This paper describes progress with our agenda of formal verification of information-flow security for realistic systems. We present CoSMed, a social media platform with verified document confidentiality. The system’s kernel is implemented and verified in the proof assistant Isabelle/HOL. For verification, we employ the framework of Bounded-Deducibility (BD) Security, previously introduced for the conference system CoCon. CoSMed is a second major case study in this framework. For CoSMed, the static topology of declassification bounds and triggers that characterized previous instances of BD security has to give way to a dynamic integration of the triggers as part of the bounds.
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Notes
- 1.
As it will turn out, this property needs to be refined in order to hold. We’ll do this in Sect. 3.3.
- 2.
By modifying \({{\mathsf {S}}}\) to produce a dedicated value as soon as \({{\mathsf {T}}}\) occurs, and modifying \({{\mathsf {B}}}\) to only consider sequences without that value.
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Acknowledgements
We are indebted to the reviewers for useful comments and suggestions. We gratefully acknowledge support:
− from Innovate UK through the Knowledge Transfer Partnership 010041 between Caritas Anchor House and Middlesex University: “The Global Noticeboard (GNB): a verified social media platform with a charitable, humanitarian purpose”
− from EPSRC through grant EP/N019547/1, Verification of Web-based Systems (VOWS)
− from DFG through grants Hu 737/5-2, MORES – Modelling and Refinement of Security Requirements on Data and Processes and Ni 491/13-3, Security Type Systems and Deduction.
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Bauereiß, T., Pesenti Gritti, A., Popescu, A., Raimondi, F. (2016). CoSMed: A Confidentiality-Verified Social Media Platform. In: Blanchette, J., Merz, S. (eds) Interactive Theorem Proving. ITP 2016. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9807. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-43144-4_6
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