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Possible Bribery in k-Approval and k-Veto Under Partial Information

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Artificial Intelligence: Methodology, Systems, and Applications (AIMSA 2016)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNAI,volume 9883))

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Abstract

We study the complexity of possible bribery under nine different notions of partial information for k-\({\mathsf {Approval}}\) and k-\({\mathsf {Veto}}\). In bribery an external agent tries to change the outcome of an election by changing some voters’ votes. Usually in voting theory, full information is assumed, i.e., the manipulative agent knows the set of candidates, the complete ranking of each voter about the candidates and the voting rule used. In this paper, we assume that the briber only has partial information about the voters’ votes and ask whether the briber can change some voters’ votes such that there is a completion of the partial profile to a full profile such that the briber’s preferred candidate (or most despised candidate in the destructive case) is a winner (not a winner) of the resulting election.

This work is supported in part by the DFG under grant ER 738/2-1.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Siegen, Unteres Schloß 3, 57072, Siegen, Germany

    Gábor Erdélyi & Christian Reger

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  1. Gábor Erdélyi
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  2. Christian Reger
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Correspondence to Christian Reger .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Winston-Salem State University, Winston Salem, North Carolina, USA

    Christo Dichev

  2. Institute of Information and Communication Technologies, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Sofia, Bulgaria

    Gennady Agre

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Erdélyi, G., Reger, C. (2016). Possible Bribery in k-Approval and k-Veto Under Partial Information. In: Dichev, C., Agre, G. (eds) Artificial Intelligence: Methodology, Systems, and Applications. AIMSA 2016. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9883. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-44748-3_29

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-44748-3_29

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