Abstract
Modern industrial control systems become increasingly interconnected and rely on external networks to provide their services. Hence they become vulnerable to security attacks that might directly jeopardise their safety. The growing understanding that if the system is not secure then it is not safe calls for novel development and verification techniques weaving security consideration into the safety-driven design. In this paper, we demonstrate how to make explicit the relationships between safety and security in the formal system development by refinement. The proposed approach allows the designers to identify at early design states mutual interdependencies between the mechanisms ensuring safety and security and build robust system architecture.
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Notes
- 1.
Due to a lack of space we present a simple model of communication. A more elaborated model similar to [5] can also be used.
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This work is partially funded by the TEKES project Cyber Trust.
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Troubitsyna, E., Laibinis, L., Pereverzeva, I., Kuismin, T., Ilic, D., Latvala, T. (2016). Towards Security-Explicit Formal Modelling of Safety-Critical Systems. In: Skavhaug, A., Guiochet, J., Bitsch, F. (eds) Computer Safety, Reliability, and Security. SAFECOMP 2016. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9922. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-45477-1_17
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-45477-1_17
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