Skip to main content

A Relationship of Conflicting Belief Masses to Open World Assumption

  • Conference paper
  • First Online:
Belief Functions: Theory and Applications (BELIEF 2016)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNAI,volume 9861))

Included in the following conference series:

Abstract

When combining belief functions by conjunctive rules of combination, conflicting belief masses often appear, which are assigned to empty set by the non-normalized conjunctive rule or normalized by Dempster’s rule of combination in Dempster-Shafer theory.

This theoretical study analyses processing of conflicting belief masses under open world assumption. It is observed that sum of conflicting masses covers not only a possibility of a non-expected hypothesis out of considered frame of discernment. It also covers, analogously to the case of close world assumption, internal conflicts of individual belief functions and conflict between/among two or several combined belief functions.

Thus, for correct and complete interpretation of open world assumption it is recommended to include extra element(s) into used frame of discernment.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 39.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    Do not forget that the equality of BFs is not equivalent to their dependence: dependent BFs, BFs from dependent believers should be same or somehow similar, dependence implies similarity, but same (or very similar) BFs do not imply their dependence.

  2. 2.

    Combining two vacuous BFs gives \(m(\varOmega ) =1\), thus \(m(\emptyset ) = 0\), but vacuous BF does not express the same positive arguments for all hypotheses, it expresses the full ignorance.

  3. 3.

    Note, that the pignistic probability gives numerically same results under close and open world assumptions, as normalization is part of pignistic transformation; and that TBM with non-normalized under OWA gives same decisional results as classic Shafer’s approach with \(\oplus \) and pignistic transformation does. The only difference is that TBM explicitly keeps in \(m(\emptyset )\) value of conflict (internal and external conflict together with masses of unexpected hypotheses) until the moment of decision.

  4. 4.

    Note, that normalized plausibility is consistent with conjunctive combination (they mutually commute), while pignistic transformation is not. Pignistic transformation commutes instead of conjunctive combination with linear combination of BFs.

References

  1. Almond, R.G.: Graphical Belief Modeling. Chapman & Hall, London (1995)

    Book  Google Scholar 

  2. Ayoun, A., Smets, P.: Data association in multi-target detection using the transferable belief model. Int. J. Intell. Syst. 16(10), 1167–1182 (2001)

    Article  MATH  Google Scholar 

  3. Burger, T.: Geometric views on conflicting mass functions: from distances to angles. Int. J. Approx. Reason. 70, 36–50 (2016)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  4. Cobb, B.R., Shenoy, P.P.: On the plausibility transformation method for translating belief function models to probability models. Int. J. Approx. Reason. 41(3), 314–330 (2006)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  5. Daniel, M.: Probabilistic transformations of belief functions. In: Godo, L. (ed.) ECSQARU 2005. LNCS (LNAI), vol. 3571, pp. 539–551. Springer, Heidelberg (2005)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  6. Daniel, M.: Conflicts within and between belief functions. In: Hüllermeier, E., Kruse, R., Hoffmann, F. (eds.) IPMU 2010. LNCS, vol. 6178, pp. 696–705. Springer, Heidelberg (2010)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  7. Daniel, M.: Non-conflicting and conflicting parts of belief functions. In: Proceedings of the 7th ISIPTA, ISIPTA 2011, pp. 149–158. Studia Universitätsverlag, Innsbruck (2011)

    Google Scholar 

  8. Daniel, M.: Properties of plausibility conflict of belief functions. In: Rutkowski, L., Korytkowski, M., Scherer, R., Tadeusiewicz, R., Zadeh, L.A., Zurada, J.M. (eds.) ICAISC 2013, Part I. LNCS, vol. 7894, pp. 235–246. Springer, Heidelberg (2013)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  9. Daniel, M.: Conflict between belief functions: a new measure based on their non-conflicting parts. In: Cuzzolin, F. (ed.) BELIEF 2014. LNCS, vol. 8764, pp. 321–330. Springer, Heidelberg (2014)

    Google Scholar 

  10. Daniel, M., Ma, J.: Conflicts of belief functions: continuity and frame resizement. In: Straccia, U., Calì, A. (eds.) SUM 2014. LNCS, vol. 8720, pp. 106–119. Springer, Heidelberg (2014)

    Google Scholar 

  11. Destercke, S., Burger, T.: Toward an axiomatic definition of conflict between belief functions. IEEE Trans. Cybern. 43(2), 585–596 (2013)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  12. Lefèvre, E., Elouedi, Z.: How to preserve the conflict as an alarm in the combination of belief functions? Decis. Support Syst. 56(1), 326–333 (2013)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  13. Liu, W.: Analysing the degree of conflict among belief functions. Artif. Intell. 170, 909–924 (2006)

    Article  MATH  Google Scholar 

  14. Martin, A.: About conflict in the theory of belief functions. In: Denœux, T., Masson, M.H. (eds.) Belief Functions: Theory and Applications. AISC, vol. 164, pp. 161–168. Springer, Heidelberg (2012)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  15. Schubert, J.: The internal conflict of a belief function. In: Denœux, T., Masson, M.H. (eds.) Belief Functions: Theory and Applications. AISC, vol. 164, pp. 169–176. Springer, Heidelberg (2012)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  16. Shafer, G.: A Mathematical Theory of Evidence. Princeton University Press, Princeton (1976)

    MATH  Google Scholar 

  17. Smets, P.: Belief functions. In: Smets, P., et al. (eds.) Non-standard Logics for Automated Reasoning, chap. 9, pp. 253–286. Academic Press, London (1988)

    Google Scholar 

  18. Smets, P., Kennes, R.: The transferable belief model. Artif. Intell. 66, 191–234 (1994)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  19. Smets, P.: Decision making in the TBM: the necessity of the pignistic transformation. Int. J. Approx. Reason. 38(2), 133–147 (2005)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  20. Smets, P.: Analyzing the combination of conflicting belief functions. Inf. Fusion 8, 387–412 (2007)

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgments

This study is a continuation of author’s research previously conducted at the Institute of Computer Science, The Czech Academy of Sciences.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Milan Daniel .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2016 Springer International Publishing Switzerland

About this paper

Cite this paper

Daniel, M. (2016). A Relationship of Conflicting Belief Masses to Open World Assumption. In: Vejnarová, J., Kratochvíl, V. (eds) Belief Functions: Theory and Applications. BELIEF 2016. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9861. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-45559-4_15

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-45559-4_15

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-45558-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-45559-4

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics