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Detecting Stack Layout Corruptions with Robust Stack Unwinding

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Research in Attacks, Intrusions, and Defenses (RAID 2016)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 9854))

Abstract

The stack is a critical memory structure to ensure the correct execution of programs because control flow changes through the data stored in it, such as return addresses and function pointers. Thus the stack has been a popular target by many attacks and exploits like stack smashing attacks and return-oriented programming (ROP). We present a novel system to detect the corruption of the stack layout using a robust stack unwinding technique and detailed stack layouts extracted from the stack unwinding information for exception handling widely available in off-the-shelf binaries. Our evaluation with real-world ROP exploits has demonstrated successful detection of them with performance overhead of only 3.93 % on average transparently without accessing any source code or debugging symbols of a protected binary.

Y. Fu—Work done during an internship at NEC Laboratories America, Princeton.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    SLIck represents Stack Layout Invariants Checker similar to fsck.

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Acknowledgments

We would like to thank our shepherd, Michalis Polychronakis, and the anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments and feedback. Yangchun Fu and Zhiqiang Lin were supported in part by the AFOSR grant no. FA9550-14-1-0173 and the NSF award no. 1453011. Any opinions, findings, conclusions, or recommendations expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of any organization.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. NEC Laboratories America, Princeton, USA

    Yangchun Fu, Junghwan Rhee, Zhichun Li, Hui Zhang & Guofei Jiang

  2. University of Texas at Dallas, Richardson, USA

    Yangchun Fu & Zhiqiang Lin

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  1. Yangchun Fu
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Correspondence to Junghwan Rhee .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of North Carolina at Chapel H , Chapel-Hill, USA

    Fabian Monrose

  2. Qatar Computing Research Institute , Doha, Qatar

    Marc Dacier

  3. Université Paris-Saclay , Evry, France

    Gregory Blanc

  4. TELECOM SudParis , EVRY, France

    Joaquin Garcia-Alfaro

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Fu, Y., Rhee, J., Lin, Z., Li, Z., Zhang, H., Jiang, G. (2016). Detecting Stack Layout Corruptions with Robust Stack Unwinding. In: Monrose, F., Dacier, M., Blanc, G., Garcia-Alfaro, J. (eds) Research in Attacks, Intrusions, and Defenses. RAID 2016. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9854. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-45719-2_4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-45719-2_4

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  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-45719-2

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