Abstract
It’s widely recognized that auction is an efficient method to allocate spectrum resource. However, due to exaggerated price asked in the primary market, secondary users with limited budget cannot access to benefits in such auction. In our paper, we consider the scenario that spectrum holder releases heterogeneous channels to secondary users. Therefore, we propose an Efficient Auction Mechanism Toward Heterogenous Spectrum Allocation, dubbed EATHER, where channels are allocated as a greedy mode based on ‘bid density’. Our auction scheme gives sufficient consideration to heterogeneity of channel which is one of the challenges in spectrum auction. We show analytically that EATHER has polynomial time complexity. More precisely, EATHER is efficient. Our analysis demonstrates EATHER achieves truthfulness, individual rationality and budget balance. The simulation evaluates the performance of EATHER minutely in teams of buyer satisfaction ratio, channel utilization ratio and social welfare.
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Acknowledgment
This work was funded in part by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 61070133, 61170201, 61472344, 61402396, 61402234); Natural Science Foundation of Jiangsu Province (BK20150460); Six talent peaks project in Jiangsu Province (2011-DZXX-032); Scientific Research Foundation of Graduate School of Jiangsu Province(Grant No. CXZZ16_1889). Professor Bin Li is the corresponding author.
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Qin, H., Li, X., Zhang, Y., Li, B. (2016). An Efficient Auction Mechanism Toward Heterogeneous Spectrum Allocation. In: Yin, H., et al. Intelligent Data Engineering and Automated Learning – IDEAL 2016. IDEAL 2016. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9937. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-46257-8_39
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-46257-8_39
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