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One-Round Attribute-Based Key Exchange in the Multi-party Setting

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Provable Security (ProvSec 2016)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 10005))

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Abstract

Attribute-based authenticated key exchange (AB-AKE) is a useful primitive that allows a group of users to establish a shared secret key and at the same time enables fine-grained access control. A straightforward approach to design an AB-AKE protocol is to extend a key exchange protocol using attribute-based authentication technique. However, insider security is a challenge security issue for AB-AKE in the multi-party setting and cannot be solved using the straightforward approach. In addition, many existing key exchange protocols for the multi-party setting (e.g., the well-known Burmester-Desmedt protocol) require multiple broadcast rounds to complete the protocol. In this paper, we propose a novel one-round attribute-based key exchange (OAKE) protocol in the multi-party setting. We define the formal security models, including session key security and insider security, for OAKE, and prove the security of the proposed protocol under some standard assumptions in the random oracle model.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Computing and Information Technology, University of Wollongong, Wollongong, NSW, 2522, Australia

    Yangguang Tian, Guomin Yang & Yi Mu

  2. School of Computing, Mathematics and Digital Technology, Manchester Metropolitan University, Manchester, M1 5GD, UK

    Kaitai Liang

  3. School of Computer Science, Shaanxi Normal University, Xi’an, 710062, China

    Yong Yu

Authors
  1. Yangguang Tian
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  2. Guomin Yang
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  3. Yi Mu
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  4. Kaitai Liang
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  5. Yong Yu
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Correspondence to Yangguang Tian .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Surrey , Guildford, United Kingdom

    Liqun Chen

  2. Nanjing University of Finance and Economics, Nanjing, China

    Jinguang Han

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Tian, Y., Yang, G., Mu, Y., Liang, K., Yu, Y. (2016). One-Round Attribute-Based Key Exchange in the Multi-party Setting. In: Chen, L., Han, J. (eds) Provable Security. ProvSec 2016. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 10005. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-47422-9_13

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-47422-9_13

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  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-47421-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-47422-9

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