Skip to main content

A Mechanism Design Approach for Influence Maximization

  • Conference paper
  • First Online:
Game Theory for Networks (GameNets 2016)

Abstract

With the proliferation of online social networks (OSNs), the characterization of diffusion processes and influence maximization over such processes is a problem of relevance and importance. Although several algorithmic frameworks for identifying influential nodes exist in literature, there is a paucity of literature in the setting of competitive influence. In this paper, we present a novel mechanism design approach to study the initial seeding problem where the agents, represented by vertices in the social network, are economically rational. The principals compete for influence in the network by setting price and incentives to illicit high degree initial subscribers, which in turn profit by infecting their neighbors. We restrict attention to equilibrium strategies and comparative statics for the agents.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 44.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 60.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

References

  1. Domingos, P., Richardson, M.: Mining the network value of customers. In: Proceedings of the Seventh ACM SIGKDD International Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining, KDD 2001, pp. 57–66. ACM, New York (2001). ISBN 1-58113-391-X

    Google Scholar 

  2. Draief, M., Heidari, H., Kearns, M.: New models for competitive contagion (2014). http://www.aaai.org/ocs/index.php/AAAI/AAAI14/paper/view/8399

  3. Friggeri, A., Adamic, L.A., Eckles, D., Cheng, J.: Rumor cascades. In: Proceedings of the Eighth International Conference on Weblogs and Social Media, ICWSM 2014, Ann Arbor, Michigan, USA, 1–4 June 2014 (2014). http://www.aaai.org/ocs/index.php/ICWSM/ICWSM14/paper/view/8122

  4. Fudenberg, D., Tirole, J.: Game Theory. MIT Press, Cambridge (1991)

    MATH  Google Scholar 

  5. Goldenberg, J., Libai, B., Muller, E.: Talk of the network: a complex systems look at the underlying process of word-of-mouth. Market. Letters 12(3), 211–223 (2001)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  6. Goyal, S., Kearns, M.: Competitive contagion in networks. CoRR, abs/1110.6372 (2011). http://arxiv.org/abs/1110.6372

  7. Granovetter, M.: Threshold models of collective behavior. Am. J. Sociol. 83(6), 1420–1443 (1978)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  8. Kempe, D., Kleinberg, J., Tardos, É.: Maximizing the spread of influence through a social network. In: Proceedings of the Ninth ACM SIGKDD International Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining, KDD 2003, pp. 137–146. ACM, New York (2003)

    Google Scholar 

  9. Rogers, E.M.: Diffusion of innovations, 5th edn. Free Press, New York (2003). ISBN 0-7432-2209-1, 978-0-7432-2209-9

    Google Scholar 

  10. Seeman, L., Singer, Y.: Adaptive seeding in social networks. In: Proceedings of the 2013 IEEE 54th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, FOCS 2013, pp. 459–468. IEEE Computer Society, Washington, DC (2013). ISBN 978-0-7695-5135-7

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgments

We wish to thank Brendan Avent, Éva Czabarka, Stephen Fenner, and Alexander Matros for their helpful discussions and suggestions.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Michael Levet .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Additional information

Supported by the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA) via Department of Interior National Business Center (DoI/NBC) contract number D12PC000337, The US Government is authorized to reproduce and distribute reprints of this work for Governmental purposes notwithstanding any copyright annotation thereon. Disclaimer: The views and conclusions contained herein are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as necessarily representing the official policies or endorsements, either expressed or implied, of IARPA, DoI/NBC, DTRA, or the US Government.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2017 ICST Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering

About this paper

Cite this paper

Levet, M., Krishnan, S. (2017). A Mechanism Design Approach for Influence Maximization. In: Cheng, J., Hossain, E., Zhang, H., Saad, W., Chatterjee, M. (eds) Game Theory for Networks. GameNets 2016. Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, vol 174. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-47509-7_6

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-47509-7_6

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-47508-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-47509-7

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics