Abstract
In recent years, the auction has been widely applied in wireless communications for spectrum allocation. In this paper, we investigate the online spectrum double auction problem and propose a Profit concerning and Truthful Online spectrum double auction Mechanism (PTOM). Different from most previous works, we consider the dynamic arrival of primary users (PUs) and secondary users (SUs) and allow SUs to request distinct time slots for using the spectrum. By introducing the priority bid, we capture the online and location associated feature to improve the spectrum utility. Based on the priority bid, we design an efficient admission and pricing rule to improve the auctioneer’s profit. Theoretical analyses are provided to prove that our mechanism has nice economic properties including individual rationality, budget-balance and resistance of time-based and value-based cheating.
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Acknowledgment
The work in this paper was partially supported by the Natural Science Foundation of Jiangsu Province (No. BK20140835), and the Postdoctoral Foundation of Jiangsu Province (No. 1401018B).
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Chen, B., Zhou, T., Fu, P., Zhai, X. (2016). PTOM: Profit Concerning and Truthful Online Spectrum Double Auction Mechanism. In: Sun, X., Liu, A., Chao, HC., Bertino, E. (eds) Cloud Computing and Security. ICCCS 2016. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 10040. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-48674-1_14
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-48674-1_14
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