Skip to main content

A Ranking Procedure with the Shapley Value

  • Conference paper
  • First Online:
Intelligent Information and Database Systems (ACIIDS 2017)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNAI,volume 10192))

Included in the following conference series:

Abstract

This paper considers the problem of electing candidates for a certain position based on ballots filled by voters. We suggest a voting procedure using cooperative game theory methods. For this, it is necessary to construct a characteristic function via the preference profile of voters. The Shapley value serves as the ranking method. The winner is the candidate having the maximum Shapley value. And finally, we explore the properties of the designed procedures.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 84.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

References

  1. Arrow, K.J.: Social Choice and Individual Values, vol. 12. Yale University Press, New Haven (2012)

    MATH  Google Scholar 

  2. Balinski, M., Laraki, R.: A theory of measuring, electing, and ranking. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. 104(21), 8720–8725 (2007)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  3. Brams, S.J.: Mathematics and Democracy: Designing Better Voting and Fair-Division Procedures. Prinston University Press, Princeton (2007)

    MATH  Google Scholar 

  4. Brams, S.J., Fishburn, P.C.: Going from theory to practice: the mixed success of approval voting. Soc. Choice Welf. 25(2–3), 457–474 (2005)

    Article  MATH  Google Scholar 

  5. Brandt, F., Brill, M., Harrenstein, P.: Tournament solutions. Handbook of Computational Social Choice (2009)

    Google Scholar 

  6. Copeland, A.H.: A reasonable social welfare function (mimeo). University of Michigan, Ann Arbor (Seminar on Application of Mathematics to the Social Sciences) (1951)

    Google Scholar 

  7. Gaertner, W., Xu, Y.: A general scoring rule. Math. Soc. Sci. 63(3), 193–196 (2012)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  8. Hillinger, C.: The case for utilitarian voting. Homo Oeconomicus 22(3), 295–321 (2005)

    Google Scholar 

  9. Schulze, M.A.: New monotonic, clone-independent, reversal symmetric, and condorcet-consistent single-winner election method. Soc. Choice Welf. 36(2), 267–303 (2011)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  10. Tideman, T.N.: Independence of clones as a criterion for voting rules. Soc. Choice Welf. 4(3), 185–206 (1987)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  11. Young, H.P.: Group choice and individual judgements. In: Mueller, D. (ed.) Perspectives on Public Choice: A Handbook, pp. 181–200. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (1997)

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgments

This work is supported by the Russian Humanitarian Science Foundation (grant 15-02-00352_a) and the Russian Fund for Basic Research (project 16-51-55006 China_a).

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Vladimir Mazalov .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2017 Springer International Publishing AG

About this paper

Cite this paper

Kondratev, A., Mazalov, V. (2017). A Ranking Procedure with the Shapley Value. In: Nguyen, N., Tojo, S., Nguyen, L., Trawiński, B. (eds) Intelligent Information and Database Systems. ACIIDS 2017. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 10192. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-54430-4_66

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-54430-4_66

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-54429-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-54430-4

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics