Skip to main content

LRCRYPT: Leakage-Resilient Cryptographic System (Design and Implementation)

  • Conference paper
  • First Online:
Information Security Applications (WISA 2016)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 10144))

Included in the following conference series:

  • 1241 Accesses

Abstract

Due to the advancement of side-channel attacks, leakage-resilient cryptography has attracted a lot of attention in recent years. Many fruitful results have been proposed by researchers. Most, if not all, of these results are theoretical in nature. Not much has been done to realize these schemes for practical use. In this work, we design and provide a leakage-resilient cryptographic system \(\mathcal {LRCRYPT}\) with programming interfaces for users to build leakage-resilient cryptographic applications. \(\mathcal {LRCRYPT}\) consists of a few fundamental building blocks that perform leakage-resilient public-key encryption, leakage-resilient signature, and leakage-resilient secret-key encryption, which can also be extended to many existing leakage resilience cryptographic primitives. We have conducted both a security analysis and a performance evaluation on \(\mathcal {LRCRYPT}\). To our knowledge, \(\mathcal {LRCRYPT}\) is the first to work in this domain.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 39.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

References

  1. https://www.openssl.org/

  2. https://gmplib.org/

  3. Akavia, A., Goldwasser, S., Vaikuntanathan, V.: Simultaneous hardcore bits and cryptography against memory attacks. In: Reingold, O. (ed.) TCC 2009. LNCS, vol. 5444, pp. 474–495. Springer, Heidelberg (2009). doi:10.1007/978-3-642-00457-5_28

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  4. Alwen, J., Dodis, Y., Wichs, D.: Leakage-resilient public-key cryptography in the bounded-retrieval model. In: Halevi, S. (ed.) CRYPTO 2009. LNCS, vol. 5677, pp. 36–54. Springer, Heidelberg (2009). doi:10.1007/978-3-642-03356-8_3

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  5. Barker, E., Barker, W., Burr, W., Polk, W., Smid, M.: Recommendation for Key Management-Part 1: General (revised). NIST special publication, Citeseer (2006)

    Google Scholar 

  6. Belaıd, S., Grosso, V., Xavier-Standaert, F.: Masking and leakage-resilient primitives: one, the other (s) or both? (2014)

    Google Scholar 

  7. Boneh, D., Boyen, X.: Efficient selective-ID secure identity-based encryption without random oracles. In: Cachin, C., Camenisch, J.L. (eds.) EUROCRYPT 2004. LNCS, vol. 3027, pp. 223–238. Springer, Heidelberg (2004). doi:10.1007/978-3-540-24676-3_14

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  8. Boneh, D., Franklin, M.: Identity-based encryption from the weil pairing. In: Kilian, J. (ed.) CRYPTO 2001. LNCS, vol. 2139, pp. 213–229. Springer, Heidelberg (2001). doi:10.1007/3-540-44647-8_13

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  9. Canetti, R., Halevi, S., Katz, J.: A forward-secure public-key encryption scheme. In: Biham, E. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2003. LNCS, vol. 2656, pp. 255–271. Springer, Heidelberg (2003). doi:10.1007/3-540-39200-9_16

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  10. Chen, Z.: https://cs.uwaterloo.ca/~astorjoh/iml.html

  11. Chow, S.S., Dodis, Y., Rouselakis, Y., Waters, B.: Practical leakage-resilient identity-based encryption from simple assumptions. In: Proceedings of the 17th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pp. 152–161. ACM (2010)

    Google Scholar 

  12. Conti, M., Di Pietro, R., Mancini, L.V., Mei, A.: (old) Distributed data source verification in wireless sensor networks. Inf. Fusion 10(4), 342–353 (2009)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  13. Dodis, Y., Lewko, A., Waters, B., Wichs, D.: Storing secrets on continually leaky devices. In: IEEE 52nd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), pp. 688–697. IEEE (2011)

    Google Scholar 

  14. Dodis, Y., Reyzin, L., Smith, A.: Fuzzy extractors: how to generate strong keys from biometrics and other noisy data. In: Cachin, C., Camenisch, J.L. (eds.) EUROCRYPT 2004. LNCS, vol. 3027, pp. 523–540. Springer, Heidelberg (2004). doi:10.1007/978-3-540-24676-3_31

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  15. Halderman, J.A., Schoen, S.D., Heninger, N., Clarkson, W., Paul, W., Calandrino, J.A., Feldman, A.J., Appelbaum, J., Felten, E.W.: Lest we remember: cold-boot attacks on encryption keys. Commun. ACM 52(5), 91–98 (2009)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  16. Kocher, P., Jaffe, J., Jun, B.: Differential power analysis. In: Wiener, M. (ed.) CRYPTO 1999. LNCS, vol. 1666, pp. 388–397. Springer, Heidelberg (1999). doi:10.1007/3-540-48405-1_25

    Google Scholar 

  17. Kocher, P.C.: Timing attacks on implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and other systems. In: Koblitz, N. (ed.) CRYPTO 1996. LNCS, vol. 1109, pp. 104–113. Springer, Heidelberg (1996). doi:10.1007/3-540-68697-5_9

    Google Scholar 

  18. Lewko, A., Rouselakis, Y., Waters, B.: Achieving leakage resilience through dual system encryption. In: Ishai, Y. (ed.) TCC 2011. LNCS, vol. 6597, pp. 70–88. Springer, Heidelberg (2011). doi:10.1007/978-3-642-19571-6_6

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  19. Lewko, A., Waters, B.: New techniques for dual system encryption and fully secure HIBE with short ciphertexts. In: Micciancio, D. (ed.) TCC 2010. LNCS, vol. 5978, pp. 455–479. Springer, Heidelberg (2010). doi:10.1007/978-3-642-11799-2_27

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  20. Lynn, B.: PBC: the pairing-based cryptography library. http://crypto.stanford.edu/pbc/

  21. Shamir, A.: Identity-based cryptosystems and signature schemes. In: Blakley, G.R., Chaum, D. (eds.) CRYPTO 1984. LNCS, vol. 196, pp. 47–53. Springer, Heidelberg (1985). doi:10.1007/3-540-39568-7_5

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  22. Waters, B.: Efficient identity-based encryption without random oracles. In: Cramer, R. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2005. LNCS, vol. 3494, pp. 114–127. Springer, Heidelberg (2005). doi:10.1007/11426639_7

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  23. Xiong, H., Zhang, C., Yuen, T.H., Zhang, E.P., Yiu, S.M., Qing, S.: Continual leakage-resilient dynamic secret sharing in the split-state model. In: Chim, T.W., Yuen, T.H. (eds.) ICICS 2012. LNCS, vol. 7618, pp. 119–130. Springer, Heidelberg (2012). doi:10.1007/978-3-642-34129-8_11

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  24. Yuen, T.H., Chow, S.S.M., Zhang, Y., Yiu, S.M.: Identity-based encryption resilient to continual auxiliary leakage. In: Pointcheval, D., Johansson, T. (eds.) EUROCRYPT 2012. LNCS, vol. 7237, pp. 117–134. Springer, Heidelberg (2012). doi:10.1007/978-3-642-29011-4_9

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgments

This work was supported in part by NSFC/RGC Joint Research Scheme (N_HKU 72913) of Hong Kong, Seed Funding Programme for Basic Research of HKU (201511159034, 201411159142), and National High Technology Research and Development Program of China (2015AA016008).

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Siu-Ming Yiu .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2017 Springer International Publishing AG

About this paper

Cite this paper

Yu, X., Cao, N., Zeng, G., Zhang, R., Yiu, SM. (2017). LRCRYPT: Leakage-Resilient Cryptographic System (Design and Implementation). In: Choi, D., Guilley, S. (eds) Information Security Applications. WISA 2016. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 10144. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-56549-1_20

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-56549-1_20

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-56548-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-56549-1

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics