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SD-OVS: SYN Flooding Attack Defending Open vSwitch for SDN

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Information Security Applications (WISA 2016)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 10144))

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Abstract

Software defined networking (SDN) is a novel programmable networking paradigm that decouples control and data planes. SDN relies heavily on the controller in control plane that tells the data plane how to handle new packets. Because the entire network may be disrupted if the controller is disabled, many attacks including SYN flooding aim to overload the controller by passing through the ingress switches. In this paper, we propose a security enhanced Open vSwitch (SD-OVS) to protect the controller from SYN flooding. The switch authenticates benign hosts by interchanging cookie packets and generates a short-lived security association (SA). The retransmitted SYN packet from these benign hosts is validated using SA and passed on to the controller. Our evaluation shows that SD-OVS protects the controller from SYN flooding at an acceptable time cost.

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Acknowledgements

This work was supported by Samsung Research Funding Center of Samsung Electronics under Project Number SRFC-TB1403-04.

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Correspondence to Xinyu Liu .

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Liu, X., Cho, B., Kim, J. (2017). SD-OVS: SYN Flooding Attack Defending Open vSwitch for SDN. In: Choi, D., Guilley, S. (eds) Information Security Applications. WISA 2016. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 10144. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-56549-1_3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-56549-1_3

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-56548-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-56549-1

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