Abstract
A core property of program semantics is that local reasoning about program fragments remains sound even when the fragments are executed within a larger system. Mathematically this property corresponds to monotonicity of refinement: if A refines B then \(\mathcal{C}(A)\) refines \(\mathcal{C}(B)\) for any (valid) context defined by \(\mathcal{C}(\cdot )\).
In other work we have studied a refines order for information flow in programs where the comparison defined by the order preserves both functional and confidentiality properties of secrets. However the semantic domain used in that work is only sufficient for scenarios where either the secrets are static (i.e. once initialised they never change), or where contexts \(\mathcal{C}(\cdot )\) never introduce fresh secrets.
In this paper we show how to extend those ideas to obtain a model of information flow which supports local reasoning about confidentiality. We use our model to explore some algebraic properties of programs which contain secrets that can be updated, and which are valid in arbitrary contexts made up of possibly freshly declared secrets.
T. Rabehaja—We acknowledge the support of the Australian Research Council Grant DP140101119. This work was carried out while visiting the Security Institute at ETH Zürich.
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Notes
- 1.
Mostly we use the conventional f(x) for application of function f to argument x. Exceptions include \(\delta _x\) for \(\delta \) applied to x and \({\mathbb D}f\) for functor \({\mathbb D}\) applied to f and f.x.y for function f(x), or f.x, applied to argument y, and \([\![H]\!].\pi \), when H is an HMM inside semantic brackets \([\![\cdot ]\!]\).
- 2.
The point distribution on x assigns probability 1 to x alone, and probability 0 to everything else; we write it [x].
- 3.
We are aware that in \({\mathbb D}({\mathbb D}\mathcal{X})\) the outer \({\mathbb D}\) is not acting over a finite type: indeed \({\mathbb D}\mathcal{X}\) is non-denumerable even when \(\mathcal{X}\) is finite, so a fully general treatment would use proper measures as we have done elsewhere [14, 16]. Here however we use the fact that, for programs, the only members of \({\mathbb D}^2\mathcal{X}\) we encounter have finite support (i.e. finitely many \({\mathbb D}\mathcal{X}\)’s within them), and constructions like \(\sum _{\delta {:}\,{\mathbb D}{\mathcal{X}}} \varDelta _\delta \delta _x\) remain meaningful.
- 4.
This is the standard method of composing functions defined by a monad.
- 5.
A matrix is stochastic if its rows sum to 1.
- 6.
Here \(\ell .i\) is the function \(\ell (i)\) of type \(\mathcal{X}{\mathbin {\rightarrow }}{\mathbb R}\) — we are using Currying.
- 7.
This was called the Coriaceous Conjecture in [2].
- 8.
We overload \(\widetilde{\mathrel \sqsubset }\) defined on HMM’s directly to be defined similarly for the abstract semantics: \(h^1 \widetilde{\mathrel \sqsubset }h^2\) of type \({\mathbb D}\mathcal{X}^2\mathbin {\rightarrow }{\mathbb D}^2\mathcal{X}^2\) if \(\mathcal{E}_{{h^1}(\delta )}(U_{\ell }) \le \mathcal{E}_{{h^2}(\delta )}(U_{\ell })\) for all \(\ell \).
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McIver, A.K., Morgan, C.C., Rabehaja, T. (2017). Algebra for Quantitative Information Flow. In: Höfner, P., Pous, D., Struth, G. (eds) Relational and Algebraic Methods in Computer Science. RAMICS 2017. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 10226. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-57418-9_1
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