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Decentralized Surplus Distribution Estimation with Weighted k-Majority Voting Games

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Highlights of Practical Applications of Cyber-Physical Multi-Agent Systems (PAAMS 2017)

Part of the book series: Communications in Computer and Information Science ((CCIS,volume 722))

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Abstract

Future energy grids and associated markets foster dynamic coalition formation in order to allow situational virtual power plant configurations. Collaboratively and distributed, such virtual power plants may take over responsibility on several emerging control tasks within the smart grid as a substitute for no longer available large plants. Temporary teamwork of individually owned and operated distributed energy resources demands for a proper and fair surplus distribution after product delivery. Distributing the surplus merely based on the absolute (load) contribution does not take into account that smaller units maybe provide the means for fine grained control as they are able to modify their load on a smaller scale. Bringing in flexibility, counts for several tasks. Shapley values provide a concept for the decision on how the generated total surplus of an agent coalition should be spread. In this paper, we propose a scheme for efficiently estimating computationally intractable Shapley values in a fully decentralized way. As a scheme to handle a set of different utility evaluation criteria we use weighted k-majority voting games. We demonstrate the applicability of the decentralized estimation by several simulation results in comparison with exact calculations.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Oldenburg, 26129, Oldenburg, Germany

    Jörg Bremer & Sebastian Lehnhoff

Authors
  1. Jörg Bremer
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  2. Sebastian Lehnhoff
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Correspondence to Jörg Bremer .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Departamento de Inteligencia Artificial, Universidad Politécnica de Madrid, Madrid, Spain

    Javier Bajo

  2. Polytechnic Institute of Porto, Porto, Portugal

    Zita Vale

  3. University of Southern Denmark, Odense, Denmark

    Kasper Hallenborg

  4. University of Porto, Porto, Portugal

    Ana Paula Rocha

  5. Lille University of Science and Technology, Lille, France

    Philippe Mathieu

  6. Poznan University of Technology, Poznan, Poland

    Pawel Pawlewski

  7. Polytechnic University of Valencia, Valencia, Spain

    Elena Del Val

  8. University of Minho, Braga, Portugal

    Paulo Novais

  9. National Laboratory of Energy and Geology, Lisbon, Portugal

    Fernando Lopes

  10. National University of Colombia, Manizales, Caldas, Colombia

    Nestor D. Duque Méndez

  11. Polytechnic University of Valencia, Valencia, Spain

    Vicente Julián

  12. Malmö University, Malmo, Sweden

    Johan Holmgren

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Bremer, J., Lehnhoff, S. (2017). Decentralized Surplus Distribution Estimation with Weighted k-Majority Voting Games. In: Bajo, J., et al. Highlights of Practical Applications of Cyber-Physical Multi-Agent Systems. PAAMS 2017. Communications in Computer and Information Science, vol 722. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-60285-1_28

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-60285-1_28

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