Abstract
In a resource sharing system, resources are shared among multiple interconnected peers. Peers act as both suppliers and customers of resources by making a certain amount of their resource directly available to others. In this paper we focus on a proportional sharing mechanism, which is fair, efficient and guarantees a market equilibrium in the resource sharing system. We study the incentives an agent may manipulate such a mechanism, by the vertex splitting strategy, for personal gains and adopt a concept called incentive ratio to quantify the amount of gains. For the resource sharing system where the underlying network ia a cycle, we prove that the incentive ratio on this kind of network is bounded by \(2\le \zeta \le 4\). Furthermore, the incentive ratio on an even cycle, a cycle with even number of vertices, is proved to be exactly 2.
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Acknowledgments
This research was partially supported by the National Nature Science Foundation of China (No. 11301475, 11426026, 61632017, 61173011), by a Project 985 grant of Shanghai Jiao Tong University, and by the Research Grant Council of Hong Kong (ECS Project No. 26200314, GRF Project No. 16213115 and GRF Project No.16243516).
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Chen, Z., Cheng, Y., Qi, Q., Yan, X. (2017). Incentive Ratios of a Proportional Sharing Mechanism in Resource Sharing. In: Cao, Y., Chen, J. (eds) Computing and Combinatorics. COCOON 2017. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 10392. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-62389-4_12
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-62389-4_12
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