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A State Recovery Attack on ACORN-v1 and ACORN-v2

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Network and System Security (NSS 2017)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 10394))

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Abstract

We propose a state recovery attack on full round of initial two versions of stream cipher ACORN with \(2^{120}\) complexity. It is possible to recover the full state of the 39-th clocking of encryption phase of ACORN using our technique. In this method one needs to inject 326 faults and 10 known plaintext bits. To the best of our knowledge this is the first work which breaks ACORN-v1 and ACORN-v2 by using a practical attack model with a complexity lesser than the complexity of exhaustive search on secret key of 128 bits.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Mathematical Sciences, National Institute of Science Education and Research (HBNI), Bhubaneswar, 752 050, Odisha, India

    Deepak Kumar Dalai & Dibyendu Roy

Authors
  1. Deepak Kumar Dalai
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  2. Dibyendu Roy
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Deepak Kumar Dalai .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Xidian University, Xi’an, China

    Zheng Yan

  2. Eurecom, Sophia Antipolos, Valbonne, France

    Refik Molva

  3. Warsaw University of Technology, Warsaw, Poland

    Wojciech Mazurczyk

  4. Aalto University, Espoo, Finland

    Raimo Kantola

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Dalai, D.K., Roy, D. (2017). A State Recovery Attack on ACORN-v1 and ACORN-v2. In: Yan, Z., Molva, R., Mazurczyk, W., Kantola, R. (eds) Network and System Security. NSS 2017. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 10394. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-64701-2_24

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-64701-2_24

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-64700-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-64701-2

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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