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A Comparison Study on Flush+Reload and Prime+Probe Attacks on AES Using Machine Learning Approaches

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Advances in Computational Intelligence Systems (UKCI 2017)

Part of the book series: Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing ((AISC,volume 650))

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Abstract

AES, ElGamal are two examples of algorithms that have been developed in cryptography to protect data in a variety of domains including native and cloud systems, and mobile applications. There has been a good deal of research into the use of side channel attacks on these algorithms. This work has conducted an experiment to detect malicious loops inside Flush+Reload and Prime+Prob attack programs against AES through the exploitation of Hardware Performance Counters (HPC). This paper examines the accuracy and efficiency of three machine learning algorithms: Neural Network (NN); Decision Tree C4.5; and K Nearest Neighbours (KNN). The study also shows how Standard Performance Evaluation Corporation (SPEC) CPU2006 benchmarks impact predictions.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The shared library that OpenSSL produces during compilation is libcrypto.so.

  2. 2.

    SPEC SPEC2006 is widely used to evaluate performance of computer systems https://www.spec.org/.

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Correspondence to Zirak Allaf .

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Allaf, Z., Adda, M., Gegov, A. (2018). A Comparison Study on Flush+Reload and Prime+Probe Attacks on AES Using Machine Learning Approaches. In: Chao, F., Schockaert, S., Zhang, Q. (eds) Advances in Computational Intelligence Systems. UKCI 2017. Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing, vol 650. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-66939-7_17

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-66939-7_17

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