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Interpreting and Understanding Simulations: The Philosophy of Social Simulation

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Simulating Social Complexity

Part of the book series: Understanding Complex Systems ((UCS))

Abstract

Simulations are usually directed at some version of the question: What is the relationship between the individual actor and the collective community? Among social scientists, this question generally falls under the topic of emergence. Sociological theorists and philosophers of science have developed sophisticated approaches to emergence, including the critical question: to what extent can emergent phenomena be reduced to explanations in terms of their components? Modelers often proceed without considering these issues; the risk is that one might develop a simulation that does not accurately reflect the observed empirical facts or one that implicitly sides with one side of a theoretical debate that remains unresolved. In this chapter, I provide some tips for those developing simulations, by drawing on a strong recent tradition of analyzing scientific explanation that is found primarily in the philosophy of science but also to some extent in sociology.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC, 27599, USA

    R. Keith Sawyer

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  1. R. Keith Sawyer
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Correspondence to R. Keith Sawyer .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Centre for Policy Modelling, Manchester Metropolitan University, Business School, Manchester, United Kingdom

    Bruce Edmonds

  2. Centre for Policy Modelling, Manchester Metropolitan University, Business School, Manchester, United Kingdom

    Ruth Meyer

Further Reading

Further Reading

Bechtel and Richardson (1993) provide a discussion of a range of philosophical issues related to the likely success of reductionist strategies in understanding and explaining complex systems, inspired by connectionist accounts of cognition, but relevant to complex systems at any level of analysis. Hedström (2005) makes a strong case for reductionist explanation of social systems, using mechanistic explanation and specifically multi-agent-based simulation in connection with empirical study.

For an examination of the philosophical accounts of mechanistic explanation and theories of emergence in sociology and philosophy, see Sawyer (2004). For an extensive review of historical and contemporary theories of emergence in the social sciences, primarily psychology and sociology, see Sawyer (2005). This advocates that sociology should be the science of social emergence. Conte et al. (2001) is a discussion between four different viewpoints specifically as they concern social simulation.

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Sawyer, R.K. (2017). Interpreting and Understanding Simulations: The Philosophy of Social Simulation. In: Edmonds, B., Meyer, R. (eds) Simulating Social Complexity. Understanding Complex Systems. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-66948-9_14

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-66948-9_14

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