Abstract
The rent-seeking behavior of domestic and foreign investors of the telecommunications sector was considered and analyzed. A game-theoretic model determining the behavior of investors was developed. Comparative results for three or more investors were obtained. The model of rent-seeking behavior, when each player is not indifferent about who will get the prize if he does not receive it himself, was proposed. The model is analyzed in cases of identical and different estimates of the rent by the players. The formulas for total equilibrium costs of the rent-seeking behavior as well as the individual equilibrium costs for each of the domestic and foreign firms under identical and different estimates of the rent were obtained. A situation with two Russian and one foreign investor of the telecom sector of the Russian Federation was deeply examined.
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Chernogorskiy, S.A., Shvetsov, K.V. (2017). A Game-Theoretic Model for Investments in the Telecommunications Industry. In: Galinina, O., Andreev, S., Balandin, S., Koucheryavy, Y. (eds) Internet of Things, Smart Spaces, and Next Generation Networks and Systems. ruSMART NsCC NEW2AN 2017 2017 2017. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 10531. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-67380-6_32
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-67380-6_32
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