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Combining Symbolic Runtime Enforcers for Cyber-Physical Systems

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Runtime Verification (RV 2017)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNPSE,volume 10548))

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Abstract

The problem of composing multiple, possibly conflicting, runtime enforcers for a cyber-physical system (CPS) is considered. A formal definition of utility-agnostic and utility-maximizing CPS enforcers is presented, followed by an algorithm to combine multiple enforcers, and resolve their conflicts based on a design-time prioritization. To implement this combination in an efficient manner, enforcers are encoded symbolically using SMT formulas, and the combination is reduced to a set of SMT satisfiability and optimization operations. Further performance gains are achieved by using the SMT solvers incrementally. The approach is validated via experiments in an indoor area with Parrot minidrones. The incremental enforcer combination is shown to achieve an order of magnitude speedup, and no deadline misses.

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    All Rights Reserved. This material is based upon work funded and supported by the Department of Defense under Contract No. FA8702-15-D-0002 with Carnegie Mellon University for the operation of the Software Engineering Institute, a federally funded research and development center. NO WARRANTY. THIS CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY AND SOFTWARE ENGINEERING INSTITUTE MATERIAL IS FURNISHED ON AN “AS-IS” BASIS. CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY MAKES NO WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED, AS TO ANY MATTER INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, WARRANTY OF FITNESS FOR PURPOSE OR MERCHANTABILITY, EXCLUSIVITY, OR RESULTS OBTAINED FROM USE OF THE MATERIAL. CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY DOES NOT MAKE ANY WARRANTY OF ANY KIND WITH RESPECT TO FREEDOM FROM PATENT, TRADEMARK, OR COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT. [DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A] This material has been approved for public release and unlimited distribution. Please see Copyright notice for non-US Government use and distribution. DM17-0207.

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Copyright 2017 Carnegie Mellon UniversityFootnote 1.

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Correspondence to Björn Andersson .

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Andersson, B., Chaki, S., de Niz, D. (2017). Combining Symbolic Runtime Enforcers for Cyber-Physical Systems. In: Lahiri, S., Reger, G. (eds) Runtime Verification. RV 2017. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 10548. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-67531-2_5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-67531-2_5

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