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Adaptivity in Network Interdiction

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Decision and Game Theory for Security (GameSec 2017)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 10575))

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Abstract

We study a network security game arising in the interdiction of fare evasion or smuggling. A defender places a security checkpoint in the network according to a chosen probability distribution over the links of the network. An intruder, knowing this distribution, wants to travel from her initial location to a target node. For every traversed link she incurs a cost equal to the transit time of that link. Furthermore, if she encounters the checkpoint, she has to pay a fine.

The intruder may adapt her path online, exploiting additional knowledge gained along the way. We investigate the complexity of computing optimal strategies for intruder and defender. We give a concise encoding of the intruders optimal strategy and present an approximation scheme to compute it. For the defender, we consider two different objectives: (i) maximizing the intruder’s cost, for which we give an approximation scheme, and (ii) maximizing the collected fine, which we show to be strongly NP-hard. We also give a paramterized bound on the worst-case ratio of the intruders best adaptive strategy to the best non-adaptive strategy, i.e., when she fixes the complete route at the start.

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Acknowledgements

This work was supported by the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation with funds of the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF), by the Millennium Nucleus Information and Coordination in Networks Grant ICM/FIC RC130003, and by a CONICYT grant (CONICYT-PCHA/MagísterNacional/2014 - 22141563).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Industrial Engineering, Universidad de Chile, Santiago, Chile

    Bastián Bahamondes & José Correa

  2. TUM School of Management and Department of Mathematics, Technische Universität München, Munich, Germany

    Jannik Matuschke

  3. Department of Civil Engineering and Computer Science, Università di Roma Tor Vergata, Rome, Italy

    Gianpaolo Oriolo

Authors
  1. Bastián Bahamondes
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  2. José Correa
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  3. Jannik Matuschke
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  4. Gianpaolo Oriolo
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Jannik Matuschke .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Universität Klagenfurt, Klagenfurt, Austria

    Stefan Rass

  2. Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, Singapore

    Bo An

  3. University of Texas at El Paso, El Paso, Texas, USA

    Christopher Kiekintveld

  4. Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, USA

    Fei Fang

  5. AIT Austrian Institute of Technology GmbH, Klagenfurt, Austria

    Stefan Schauer

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Bahamondes, B., Correa, J., Matuschke, J., Oriolo, G. (2017). Adaptivity in Network Interdiction. In: Rass, S., An, B., Kiekintveld, C., Fang, F., Schauer, S. (eds) Decision and Game Theory for Security. GameSec 2017. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 10575. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-68711-7_3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-68711-7_3

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-68710-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-68711-7

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