Abstract
As more applications are built on top of blockchain and public ledger, different approaches are developed to improve the performance of blockchain construction. Recently Intel proposed a new concept of proof-of-elapsed-time (PoET), which leverages trusted computing to enforce random waiting times for block construction. However, trusted computing component may not be perfect and 100% reliable. It is not clear, to what extent, blockchain systems based on PoET can tolerate failures of trusted computing component. The current design of PoET lacks rigorous security analysis and a theoretical foundation for assessing its strength against such attacks. To fulfill this gap, we develop a theoretical framework for evaluating a PoET based blockchain system, and show that the current design is vulnerable in the sense that adversary can jeopardize the blockchain system by only compromising \(\varTheta (\log \log n/\log n)\) fraction of the participating nodes, which is very small when n is relatively large. Based on our theoretical analysis, we also propose methods to mitigate these vulnerabilities.
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Notes
- 1.
Throughout this paper, nodes and users are used interchangably.
- 2.
The SGX component is used to generate a certificate for the public key and send the certificate to the system.
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Acknowledgement
This material is based upon work supported by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security under Grant Award Number 113039. The views and conclusions contained in this document are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as necessarily representing the official policies, either expressed or implied, of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.
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Chen, L., Xu, L., Shah, N., Gao, Z., Lu, Y., Shi, W. (2017). On Security Analysis of Proof-of-Elapsed-Time (PoET). In: Spirakis, P., Tsigas, P. (eds) Stabilization, Safety, and Security of Distributed Systems. SSS 2017. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 10616. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-69084-1_19
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