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Is RCB a Leakage Resilient Authenticated Encryption Scheme?

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Secure IT Systems (NordSec 2017)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 10674))

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Abstract

Leakage resilient cryptography wants to provide security against side channel attacks. In this paper, we present several issues of the \(\mathsf {RCB}\) block cipher mode, proposed by Agrawal et al. in [2]. \(\mathsf {RCB}\) is the first Leakage Resilient Authenticated Encryption (AE) scheme ever presented. In particular, we present a forgery attack that breaks the \(\textsf {INT-CTXT} \) security which is a fundamental requirement in the design of AE schemes.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The authors of \(\mathsf {OCB}\) did never claim nonce misuse resistance, but [2] made such claims for \(\mathsf {RCB}\).

  2. 2.

    Else, Alice and Bob would perform interactive resynchronization [2, Fig. 2].

  3. 3.

    Bob must increase the counter, even if the message turns out to be invalid. Otherwise, Bob would use the same internal key more than once, thus destroying the main purpose of using \(\mathsf {RCB}\), namely its claimed leakage-resilience.

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Acknowledgments

Farzaneh Abed was supported by the Simple Scry project with Cisco.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Bauhaus-Universität Weimar, Weimar, Germany

    Farzaneh Abed & Stefan Lucks

  2. ICTEAM/ELEN/Crypto Group, Université catholique de Louvain, Louvain-la-neuve, Belgium

    Francesco Berti

Authors
  1. Farzaneh Abed
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  2. Francesco Berti
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  3. Stefan Lucks
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Francesco Berti .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Tartu, Tartu, Estonia

    Helger Lipmaa

  2. Chalmers University of Technology, Gothenburg, Sweden

    Aikaterini Mitrokotsa

  3. University of Tartu, Tartu, Estonia

    Raimundas Matulevičius

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Abed, F., Berti, F., Lucks, S. (2017). Is RCB a Leakage Resilient Authenticated Encryption Scheme?. In: Lipmaa, H., Mitrokotsa, A., Matulevičius, R. (eds) Secure IT Systems. NordSec 2017. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 10674. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-70290-2_3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-70290-2_3

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