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Free-Riding in Common Facility Sharing

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Transactions on Computational Collective Intelligence XXVII

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((TCCI,volume 10480))

Abstract

We deal with the free-riding situations that may arise from sharing maintenance cost of a facility among its potential users. The non-users may ask for a check to assess who the users are, but they have to pay the related cost; consequently, a non-user may not ask for the check, with the hope that the other non-users ask and pay for it. In this paper, we provide incentives for asking for the check, without suffering a higher cost

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Notes

  1. 1.

    When no confusion arises, we write \(\gamma \) instead of \(\gamma (C)\).

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Acknowledgment

The authors gratefully acknowledge the participants to the second workshop “Quantitative methods of group decision making” held at the Wroclaw School of Banking in November 2016 for useful discussions.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Mechanical, Energy, Management and Transportation Engineering, University of Genova, Genova, Italy

    Federica Briata

  2. Department of Science and Technological Innovation, University of Eastern Piedmont, Vercelli, Italy

    Vito Fragnelli

Authors
  1. Federica Briata
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  2. Vito Fragnelli
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Vito Fragnelli .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Finance and Management, The WSB University, Wroclaw, Poland

    Jacek Mercik

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Briata, F., Fragnelli, V. (2017). Free-Riding in Common Facility Sharing. In: Mercik, J. (eds) Transactions on Computational Collective Intelligence XXVII. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 10480. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-70647-4_10

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-70647-4_10

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-70646-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-70647-4

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