Abstract
We deal with the free-riding situations that may arise from sharing maintenance cost of a facility among its potential users. The non-users may ask for a check to assess who the users are, but they have to pay the related cost; consequently, a non-user may not ask for the check, with the hope that the other non-users ask and pay for it. In this paper, we provide incentives for asking for the check, without suffering a higher cost
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
- 1.
When no confusion arises, we write \(\gamma \) instead of \(\gamma (C)\).
References
Briata, F.: Noncooperative games from TU games with information cost. Int. Game Theor. Rev. 13, 301–323 (2011)
Hurwicz, L.: The design of mechanisms for resource allocation. Am. Econ. Rev. 63, 1–30 (1973)
Maskin, E.: Mechanism design: how to implement social goals. Les Prix Nobel 2007, 296–307 (2008)
Moretti, S., Patrone, F.: Cost allocation games with information costs. Math. Methods Oper. Res. 59, 419–434 (2004)
Myerson, R.B., Satterthwaite, M.A.: Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading. J. Econ. Theor. 29, 265–281 (1983)
Nash, J.F.: Equilibrium points in n-person games. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 36, 48–49 (1950)
Roth, A.E.: The economist as engineer: game theory, experimentation, and computation as tools for design economics. Econometrica 70, 1341–1378 (2002)
Vickrey, W.: Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders. J. Finance 16, 8–37 (1961)
Acknowledgment
The authors gratefully acknowledge the participants to the second workshop “Quantitative methods of group decision making” held at the Wroclaw School of Banking in November 2016 for useful discussions.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2017 Springer International Publishing AG
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Briata, F., Fragnelli, V. (2017). Free-Riding in Common Facility Sharing. In: Mercik, J. (eds) Transactions on Computational Collective Intelligence XXVII. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 10480. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-70647-4_10
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-70647-4_10
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-70646-7
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-70647-4
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)