Abstract
The behavioral models of classical values (like the Shapley and Banzhaf values) consider the contributions to coalition S as contributions delivered by the players individually joining such a coalition as it is being formed; i.e., v(S) – v(S \ {i}). In this paper, we propose another approach to values where these contributions are considered as given by sets of players: (v(S) – v(S \ R)), where S, R are subsets of the set of all players involved in cooperative game v. Based on this new approach, several sub-coalitional values are proposed, and some properties of these values are shown.
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Acknowledgements
Research is financed by the statutory funds (no. 11/11.200.322) of the AGH University of Science and Technology. The author expresses gratitude to Gianfranco Gambarelli and Cesarino Bertini for useful suggestions and precious help.
The author also gratefully acknowledge the helpful comments and suggestions of two referees.
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Stach, I. (2017). Sub-Coalitional Approach to Values. In: Mercik, J. (eds) Transactions on Computational Collective Intelligence XXVII. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 10480. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-70647-4_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-70647-4_6
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