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Limiting User’s Sybil Attack in Resource Sharing

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Web and Internet Economics (WINE 2017)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNISA,volume 10660))

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Abstract

In this work, we discuss the sybil attack to a sharing economic system where each participant contributes its own resource for all to share. We are interested in the robustness of the market equilibrium mechanism in withstanding such an attack, in terms of the incentive ratio to measure how much one could gain by splitting its identity and reconstructing its communication connections with others. On one hand, weshow that no player can increase more than \(\sqrt{2}\) times of their original share from the market equilibrium solution, by characterizing the worst case under which strategic agent can obtain the maximum utility gain after manipulation. On the other hand, such a bound of \(\sqrt{2}\) is proved to be tight by constructing a proper instance, for which this bound is reached.

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Acknowledgments

This research was partially supported by the National Nature Science Foundation of China (Nos. 11301475, 11426026, 61632017, 61173011), by a Project 985 grant of Shanghai Jiao Tong University, by the Research Grant Council of Hong Kong (ECS Project Nos. 26200314, GRF Project No. 16213115 and GRF Project No. 16243516), and by Ant Finantial.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Industrial Engineering and Logistics Management, The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Clear Water Bay, Hong Kong

    Zhou Chen & Qi Qi

  2. School of Business, Suzhou University of Science and Technology, Suzhou, 215009, China

    Yukun Cheng

  3. Department of Computer Science, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai, 200240, China

    Xiaotie Deng & Xiang Yan

Authors
  1. Zhou Chen
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  2. Yukun Cheng
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  3. Xiaotie Deng
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  4. Qi Qi
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  5. Xiang Yan
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Xiang Yan .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Microsoft Research, Redmond, Washington, USA

    Nikhil R. Devanur

  2. Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, Shanghai, China

    Pinyan Lu

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Chen, Z., Cheng, Y., Deng, X., Qi, Q., Yan, X. (2017). Limiting User’s Sybil Attack in Resource Sharing. In: R. Devanur, N., Lu, P. (eds) Web and Internet Economics. WINE 2017. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 10660. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71924-5_8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71924-5_8

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