Abstract
This article presents an analysis of the Shapley value of simple cooperative games in situations where the weights of the players and the majority required to accept a decision (in the form of a winning coalition) are given by fuzzy numbers. We propose a modification of the concept of the additivity of the payoff function which is necessary in this framework.
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Notes
- 1.
The property of additivity (also called the “law of aggregation” by Shapley (1953)): for any two games \( \left( {N, v} \right),\left( {N, w} \right) \): \( \varphi \left( {v + w} \right) = \varphi \left( {v) + \varphi (w} \right) \) (i.e. \( \varphi_{i} \left( {v + w} \right) = \varphi_{i} \left( v \right) \) + \( \varphi_{i} \left( w \right) \) for all i in N, where the game \( \left( {v + w} \right) \) is defined by \( \left( {v + w} \right)\left( S \right) = v\left( S \right) + w\left( S \right) \) for any coalition S). This property states that when two independent games are combined, their values must be added player by player. This is a prime requisite for any scheme designed to be eventually applied to systems of interdependent games.
- 2.
There exist several theorems related to additional properties of the Shapley value. For example, Young (1985) proved that the Shapley value is the only value satisfying the properties of effectiveness, symmetry and strong monotonicity, van den Brink (2001) showed that it is the only value preserving a fairness condition according to a modification of marginal contributions to a coalition and Myerson (1977) showed that it preserves fairness based on balanced contributions to a coalition.
- 3.
q defines what proportion of the votes describes a winning majority.
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Gładysz, B., Mercik, J. (2018). The Shapley Value in Fuzzy Simple Cooperative Games. In: Nguyen, N., Hoang, D., Hong, TP., Pham, H., Trawiński, B. (eds) Intelligent Information and Database Systems. ACIIDS 2018. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 10751. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-75417-8_39
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