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Against Leben’s Rawlsian Collision Algorithm for Autonomous Vehicles

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Philosophy and Theory of Artificial Intelligence 2017 (PT-AI 2017)

Part of the book series: Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics ((SAPERE,volume 44))

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Abstract

Suppose that an autonomous vehicle encounters a situation where (i) imposing a risk of harm on at least one person is unavoidable; and (ii) a choice about how to allocate risks of harm between different persons is required. What does morality require in these cases? Derek Leben defends a Rawlsian answer to this question. I argue that we have reason to reject Leben’s answer.

I am extremely grateful to Chris Bertram, Noah Goodall, Jason Konek, Derek Leben, Niall Paterson, and Richard Pettigrew for their comments on earlier drafts. I am also grateful to audiences at the Philosophy and Theory of Artificial Intelligence Conference at the University of Leeds, and the Artificial Ethics Symposium at the University of Southampton.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    I use ‘AV’ to mean Level 5 autonomous vehicles in accordance with the Society for Automotive Engineers autonomous vehicle classification scheme. These vehicles require no human intervention or supervision in any circumstances that might arise on the road.

  2. 2.

    Leben (2017) is, to my knowledge, the first person to apply the original position to the moral design problem. But it is worth noting that Schelling (2006) defends a similar position for determining whom to save in many-versus-one rescue cases.

  3. 3.

    Leben does not use the term ‘leximin’. He writes ‘[there] is one part of the Maximin procedure, that, to my knowledge, has not been worked out sufficiently well by Rawls or anybody else, and is perhaps the only original contribution that I have to make to the moral theory itself […] It seems clear that agents in the original position would also consider the next-lowest payoffs, since they have an equal chance of being the next payer, and are interested in maximising her minimum as well’ (2017: 110). The iterated form of maximin described by Leben is called leximin, and it has featured in moral philosophy (e.g. Otsuka 2006: 119–121; Hirose 2015: 29) and welfare economics (e.g. Sen 1976; Hammond 1976).

  4. 4.

    A further disanalogy is that whilst survival is a primary good, it is not obvious that the probability of survival is a primary good. So, the parties in Leben’s original position are choosing between alternative gambles concerning a primary good. I am grateful to Richard Pettigrew for this point.

  5. 5.

    Note that, with complete information, leximin mandates saving the greater number in many-versus-one cases (Hirose 2015: 164–5). So, Leben advocates using leximin given the information available, but leximin would not mandate randomising if complete information about the survival probabilities were given.

  6. 6.

    The axioms: let \( \prec \) denote strict preference, \( \sim \) denote indifference and \( { \preccurlyeq } \) denote weak preference. Completeness holds that for any two lotteries \( A \), \( B \), either \( A \prec B \), \( B \prec A \) or \( A \sim B \). Transitivity holds that if \( A\,{ \preccurlyeq }\,B \) and \( B\,{ \preccurlyeq }\,C \) then \( A\,{ \preccurlyeq }\,C \). Continuity holds that, if \( A\,{ \preccurlyeq }\,B\,{ \preccurlyeq }\,C \), then there exists a probability \( p \in \left[ {0,1} \right] \) such that \( \left[ {pA + \left( {1 - p} \right)C} \right] \sim B \). Independence holds that if \( A \prec B \), then for any \( C \) and \( p \in \left[ {0,1} \right] \), \( \left[ {pA + \left( {1 - p} \right)C} \right] \prec \left[ {pB + \left( {1 - p} \right)C} \right] \). My argument makes use of the Archimedean Property, which is sometimes assumed instead of completeness. But if either completeness or the Archimedean Property is assumed, the other is entailed by the von Neumann-Morgenstern Expected Utility Theorem.

  7. 7.

    The lotteries in square brackets should be read, e.g. ‘\( A \) with a probability \( 1 - \varepsilon \) and \( C \) with a probability \( \varepsilon \)’.

  8. 8.

    The earliest statement of the relation between maximin and greatest equal chances is, to my knowledge, due to Parfit (2003: 76–8). For discussions of lotteries like the one described see (Rasmussen 2012), Rivera-López (2008) and Hirose (2015: 121–2).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Bristol, Bristol, UK

    Geoff Keeling

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  1. Geoff Keeling
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Correspondence to Geoff Keeling .

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  1. Interdisciplinary Ethics Applied (IDEA) Centre, University of Leeds, Leeds, West Yorkshire, UK

    Vincent C. Müller

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Keeling, G. (2018). Against Leben’s Rawlsian Collision Algorithm for Autonomous Vehicles. In: Müller, V. (eds) Philosophy and Theory of Artificial Intelligence 2017. PT-AI 2017. Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics, vol 44. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-96448-5_29

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