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Tradeoffs in Worst-Case Equilibria

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 2909))

Abstract

We investigate the problem of routing traffic through a congested network in an environment of non-cooperative users. We use the worst-case coordination ratio suggested by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou to measure the performance degradation due to the lack of a centralized traffic regulating authority. We provide a full characterization of the worst-case coordination ratio in the restricted assignment and unrelated parallel links models. In particular, we quantify the tradeoff between the ”negligibility” of the traffic controlled by each user and the coordination ratio. We analyze both pure and mixed strategies systems and identify the range where their performance is similar.

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© 2004 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Awerbuch, B., Azar, Y., Richter, Y., Tsur, D. (2004). Tradeoffs in Worst-Case Equilibria. In: Solis-Oba, R., Jansen, K. (eds) Approximation and Online Algorithms. WAOA 2003. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2909. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24592-6_4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24592-6_4

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-21079-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-24592-6

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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