Analysis of BGP Update Surge during Slammer Worm Attack

Abstract

Although the Internet routing infrastructure was not a direct target of the January 2003 Slammer worm attack, the worm attack coincided in time with a large, globally observed increase in the number of BGP routing update messages. Our analysis shows that the current global routing protocol BGP allows local connectivity dynamics to propagate globally. As a result, any small number of edge networks can potentially cause wide-scale routing overload. For example, two small edges ASes, which announced less than 0.25% of BGP routing table entries, contributed over 6% of total update messages observed at monitoring points during the worm attack. Although BGP route flap damping has been proposed to eliminate such undesirable global consequences of edge instability, our analysis shows that damping has not been fully deployed even within the Internet core. Our simulation further reveals that partial deployment of BGP damping not only has limited effect, but may also worsen the routing performance under certain topological conditions. The results show that it remains a research challenge to design a routing protocol that can prevent local dynamics from triggering global messages in order to scale well in a large, dynamic environment.

This material is based upon work supported by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) under Contract No DABT63-00-C-1027 and by National Science Fundation(NSF) under Contract No ANI-0221453. Any opinions, findings and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the DARPA or NSF.