Abstract
Verification and validation (V&V) is a critical issue in both multi-agent systems (MAS) and agent-based social simulation (ABSS). As the first step towards V&V methods for MAS and ABSS, this paper investigates whether different computational models can produce the same results. Specifically, we compare three computational models with different learning mechanisms in a multiagent-based simulation and analyze the results of these models in a bargaining game as one of the fundamental examples in game theory. This type of V&V is not based on the between-models addressed in conventional research, but on a within-model. A comparison of the simulation results reveals that (1) computational models and simulation results are minimally verified and validated in the case of ES(evolutionary strategy)- and RL(reinforcement learning)-based agents; and (2) learning mechanisms that enable agents to acquire their rational behaviors differ according to the knowledge representation (i.e., the strategies in the bargaining game) of the agents.
Paper submitted to LNCS for The Fourth Workshop on Multi-Agent Based Simulation (MABS’03)
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Arthur, W.B., Holland, J.H., Palmer, R., Tayler, P.: Asset Pricing Under Endogenous Expectations in an Artificial Stock Market. In: Arthur, W.B., Durlauf, S.N., Lane, D.A. (eds.) The Economy as an Evolving Complex System II, pp. 15–44. Addison-Wesley, Reading (1997)
Axtell, R., Axelrod, R., Epstein, J., Cohen, M.D.: Aligning Simulation Models: A Case Study and Results. Computational and Mathematical OrganizationTheory (CMOT) 1(1), 123–141 (1996)
Bäck, T., Rudolph, G., Schwefel, H.: Evolutionary Programming and Evolution Strategies: Similarities and Differences. In: The 2nd Annual Evolutionary Programming Conference, pp. 11–22 (1992)
Berard, B., Bidoit, M., Finkel, A., Laroussinie, F., Petit, A., Petrucci, L., Schnoebelen, P., McKenzie, P.: Systems and Software Verification: Model-Checking Techniques and Tools. Springer, Heidelberg (2001)
Carley, K.M., Gasser, L.: Computational and Organization Theory. In: Weiss, G. (ed.) Multiagent Systems – Modern Approach to Distributed Artificial Intelligence, pp. 299–330. The MIT Press, Cambridge (1999)
Friedman, D., Sunder, S.: Experimental Methods: A Primer for Economists. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (1994)
Goldberg, D.E.: Genetic Algorithms in Search, Optimization, and Machine Learning. Addison-Wesley, Reading (1989)
Greenblat, C.S.: Designing Games and Simulations: An Illustrated Handbook. Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks (1988)
Güth, W., Schmittberger, R., Schwarze, B.: An Experimental Analysis of Ultimatum Bargaining. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 3, 367–388 (1982)
Holland, J.H.: Adaptation in Natural and Artificial Systems. University of Michigan Press, Michigan (1975)
Holland, J.H., Holyoak, K.J., Nisbett, R.E., Thagard, P.R.: Induction. The MIT Press, Cambridge (1986)
Kagel, J.H., Roth, A.E.: Handbook of Experimental Economics. Princeton University Press, Princeton (1995)
Miller, L.A., Groundwater, E.H., Hayes, J.E., Mirsky, S.M.: Survey and Assessment of Conventional Software Verification and Validation Methods. Report NUREG/CR-6018, Nuclear Regulatory Commission (1993)
Muthoo, A.: Bargaining Theory with Applications. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (1999)
Muthoo, A.: A Non-Technical Introduction to Bargaining Theory. World Economics, 145–166 (2000)
Neelin, J., Sonnenschein, H., Spiegel, M.: A Further Test of Noncooperative Bargaining Theory: Comment. American Economic Review 78(4), 824–836 (1988)
Nydegger, R.V., Owen, G.: Two-Person Bargaining: An Experimental Test of the Nash Axioms. International Journal of Game Theory 3(4), 239–249 (1974)
O’Leary, D.E.: Validating of Expert Systems with Applications to Auditing and Accounting Expert Systems. Decision Science 18(3), 464–486 (1987)
Oliver, J.R.: On Artificial Agents for Negotiation in Electronic Commerce. Ph.D. Thesis, University of Pennsylvania (1996)
Osborne, M.J., Rubinstein, A.: A Course in Game Theory. MIT Press, Cambridge (1994)
Roth, A.E., Prasnikar, V., Okuno-Fujiwara, M., Zamir, S.: Bargaining and Market Behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: An Experimental Study. American Economic Review 81(5), 1068–1094 (1991)
Rubinstein, A.: Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model. Econometrica 50(1), 97–109 (1982)
Smith, S.F.: Flexible Learning of Problem Solving Heuristics through Adaptive Search. In: The 8th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence IJCAI 1983, pp. 422–425 (1983)
Ståhl, I.: Bargaining Theory, Economics Research Institute at the Stockholm School of Economics (1972)
Sutton, R.S., Bart, A.G.: Reinforcement Learning – An Introduction. The MIT Press, Cambridge (1998)
Takadama, K., Sugimoto, N., Nawa, N.E., Shimohara, K.: Grounding to Both Theory and Real World by Agent-Based Simulation: Analyzing Learning Agents in Bargaining Game. In: NAACSOS (North American Association for Computational Social and Organizational Science) Conference 2003 (2003) (to appear)
Watkins, C.J.C.H., Dayan, P.: Technical Note: Q-Learning. Machine Learning 8, 55–68 (1992)
Zlatareva, N., Preece, A.: State of the Art in Automated Validation of Knowledge-Based Systems. Expert Systems with Applications 7(2), 151–167 (1994)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2003 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Takadama, K., Suematsu, Y.L., Sugimoto, N., Nawa, N.E., Shimohara, K. (2003). Towards Verification and Validation in Multiagent-Based Systems and Simulations: Analyzing Different Learning Bargaining Agents. In: Hales, D., Edmonds, B., Norling, E., Rouchier, J. (eds) Multi-Agent-Based Simulation III. MABS 2003. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 2927. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24613-8_3
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24613-8_3
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-20736-8
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-24613-8
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive