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International Conference on Current Trends in Theory and Practice of Computer Science

SOFSEM 2004: SOFSEM 2004: Theory and Practice of Computer Science pp 373–384Cite as

Fully Truthful Mechanisms

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 2932))

Abstract

In this paper, we consider that in mechanism design, the mechanism itself has a reservation value to the result of the output. Based on this extended model, we define a more general definition of truthfulness, fully truthfulness. Unfortunately, the ordinary VCG mechanism is not fully truthful in our new model. Therefore we extend VCG mechanism and discuss the fully truthfulness of the new mechanisms.

This work was supported by grants from China National Natural Science Fund [60273045], and the Ministry of Science and Technology [2001CCA03000].

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Computer Science, Fudan University, P. R. China

    Ning Chen & Hong Zhu

Authors
  1. Ning Chen
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  2. Hong Zhu
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Faculty of Sciences, ILLC - Department of Mathematics and Computer Science, University of Amsterdam, Plantage Muidergracht 24, 1018 TV, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

    Peter Van Emde Boas

  2. Faculty of Mathematics and Physics, Charles University, Prague

    Jaroslav Pokorný

  3. Institute of Informatics and Software Engineering Faculty of Informatics and Information technologies, Slovak University of Technology, Ilkovičova 3, 842 16, Bratislava

    Mária Bieliková

  4. Institute of Computer Science, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, Pod Vodárenskou věží 2, 182 07, Prague 8 Czech Republic

    Július Štuller

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© 2004 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Chen, N., Zhu, H. (2004). Fully Truthful Mechanisms. In: Van Emde Boas, P., Pokorný, J., Bieliková, M., Štuller, J. (eds) SOFSEM 2004: Theory and Practice of Computer Science. SOFSEM 2004. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2932. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24618-3_32

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24618-3_32

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-20779-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-24618-3

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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