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The Price of Anarchy when Costs Are Non-separable and Asymmetric

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Integer Programming and Combinatorial Optimization (IPCO 2004)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 3064))

Abstract

In this paper we characterize the “price of anarchy”, i.e., the inefficiency between user and system optimal solutions, when costs are non-separable, asymmetric and nonlinear, generalizing earlier work that has addressed “the price of anarchy” under separable costs. This generalization models traffic equilibria, competitive multi-period pricing and competitive supply chains. The bounds established in this paper are tight and explicitly account for the degree of asymmetry and nonlinearity of the cost function. We introduce an alternate proof method for providing bounds that uses ideas from semidefinite optimization. Finally, in the context of multi-period pricing our analysis establishes that user and system optimal solutions coincide.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, 02139, USA

    G. Perakis

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  1. G. Perakis
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of IEOR, Columbia University, 500 West 120th Street, 10027, New York, NY, USA

    Daniel Bienstock

  2. H. Milton Stewart School of Industrial and Systems Engineering, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA, USA

    George Nemhauser

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© 2004 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Perakis, G. (2004). The Price of Anarchy when Costs Are Non-separable and Asymmetric. In: Bienstock, D., Nemhauser, G. (eds) Integer Programming and Combinatorial Optimization. IPCO 2004. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3064. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-25960-2_4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-25960-2_4

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-22113-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-25960-2

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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