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Pre-production Methods of a Response to Certificates with the Common Status –Design and Theoretical Evaluation–

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Public Key Infrastructure (EuroPKI 2004)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 3093))

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Abstract

The Online Certificate Status Protocol provides the up-to-date response to certificate status queries. To reduce the risk of denial of service attacks, the responder can pre-produce responses. However this approach has the disadvantage that computational costs of the responder are inefficient since the responder should pre-produce one response message for each certificate. This paper proposes efficient pre-producing methods, which the responder can pre-produce a response message for each group consisting of certificates with the common status. In our methods, computational costs of the responder are efficient, compared with the previous pre-producing method.

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Koga, S., Ryou, JC., Sakurai, K. (2004). Pre-production Methods of a Response to Certificates with the Common Status –Design and Theoretical Evaluation–. In: Katsikas, S.K., Gritzalis, S., López, J. (eds) Public Key Infrastructure. EuroPKI 2004. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3093. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-25980-0_7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-25980-0_7

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-22216-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-25980-0

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