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Fault Attacks on Signature Schemes

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Information Security and Privacy (ACISP 2004)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 3108))

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Abstract

In 1996, Bao, Deng, Han, Jeng, Narasimhalu and Ngair presented bit-fault attacks on some signature schemes such as DSA, El Gamal and Schnorr signatures schemes. Unfortunately nowadays, their fault model is still very difficult to apply in practice. In this paper we extend Bao et al.’s attacks on the DSA, the ElGamal and the Schnorr signature by using a byte-fault model which is easier to put into practice. We also present byte-fault attacks on two other signature schemes: ECDSA and XTR-DSA. All these fault attacks are based on a common principle which allows us to obtain a 160-bit secret key by using 2300 faulty signatures on average.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Oberthur Card Systems, 25, rue Auguste Blanche, 92 800, Puteaux, France

    Christophe Giraud

  2. Logos Smart Card A/S, Sorgenfrivej 18, DK-2800, Kgs. Lyngby, Denmark

    Erik W. Knudsen

Authors
  1. Christophe Giraud
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  2. Erik W. Knudsen
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Centre for Advanced Computing - Algorithms and Cryptography Department of Computing, Macquarie University, Australia

    Huaxiong Wang

  2. Department of Computing, Macquarie University, NSW 2109, Sydney, Australia

    Josef Pieprzyk

  3. Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia

    Vijay Varadharajan

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Giraud, C., Knudsen, E.W. (2004). Fault Attacks on Signature Schemes. In: Wang, H., Pieprzyk, J., Varadharajan, V. (eds) Information Security and Privacy. ACISP 2004. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3108. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-27800-9_41

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-27800-9_41

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-22379-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-27800-9

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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