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New Power Analysis on the Ha-Moon Algorithm and the MIST Algorithm

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Information and Communications Security (ICICS 2004)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 3269))

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Abstract

Side channel attacks have been attracted by most implementers of cryptographic primitives. And Randomized Exponentiation Algorithm (REA) is believed to be a good countermeasure against them. This paper analyzes the security of the two well-known REAs, the Ha-Moon algorithm and the MIST algorithm. Finding the fact that the intermediate values are variable in two cases, this paper shows that Ha-Moon algorithm is not secure even when it deploys both randomized binary recording technique and branch removing technique for DPA and SPA, respectively. In addition, this paper analyzes the security of the MIST algorithm. Some adaptively chosen ciphertext attacker can lower the security deeply, which can be placed more below than Walter’s analysis.

This research was done during the first author was enrolled in POSTECH. This research was supported by University IT Research Center Project, the Brain Korea 21 Project.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Penta Security Systems Inc, Seoul, Korea

    Sang Gyoo Sim

  2. IS Lab, Dept. of EEE, POSTECH, Pohang, Korea

    Dong Jin Park & Pil Joong Lee

Authors
  1. Sang Gyoo Sim
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  2. Dong Jin Park
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  3. Pil Joong Lee
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Information and Communication Technologies, University of A Coruña, Spain

    Javier Lopez

  2. Chinese Academy of Sciences, Institute of Softwear, 100080, Beijing, China

    Sihan Qing

  3. Graduate School of Systems and Information Engineering, University of Tsukuba, 1-1-1 Tennodai, Tsukuba, 305-8573, Ibaraki, Japan

    Eiji Okamoto

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© 2004 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Sim, S.G., Park, D.J., Lee, P.J. (2004). New Power Analysis on the Ha-Moon Algorithm and the MIST Algorithm. In: Lopez, J., Qing, S., Okamoto, E. (eds) Information and Communications Security. ICICS 2004. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3269. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-30191-2_23

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-30191-2_23

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-23563-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-30191-2

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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