Abstract
We present SATMC (SAT-based Model Checker), an open and flexible platform for SAT-based bounded model checking [8] of security protocols. Under the standard assumptions of perfect cryptography and of strong typing, SATMC performs a bounded analysis of the problem by considering scenarios with a finite number of sessions whereby messages are exchanged on a channel controlled by the most general intruder based on the Dolev-Yao model [12].
This work was partially funded by the FET Open EC Project “AVISPA: Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications” (IST-2001-39252) and by the FIRB Project no. RBAU01P5SS.
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Armando, A., Compagna, L. (2004). SATMC: A SAT-Based Model Checker for Security Protocols. In: Alferes, J.J., Leite, J. (eds) Logics in Artificial Intelligence. JELIA 2004. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 3229. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-30227-8_68
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-30227-8_68
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