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A Lightweight Mutual Authentication Based on Proxy Certificate Trust List

  • Conference paper
Parallel and Distributed Computing: Applications and Technologies (PDCAT 2004)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 3320))

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Abstract

We propose Proxy Certificate Trust List (PCTL) to efficiently record delegation traces for grid computing. Our security solution based on PCTL provides functions as follows: (1) On-demand inquiries about real time delegation information of grid computing underway; (2) Lightweight mutual authentication that is beneficial for proxy nodes with limited computation power as wireless devices in mobile computing; (3) A kind of revocation mechanism for proxy certificates to improve the security and availability of grid computing.

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References

  1. Foster, I., et al.: The Anatomy of the Grid: Enabling Scalable Virtual Organizations. Supercomputer Applications 15(3) (2001)

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  2. Welch, V., et al.: Security for Grid Services. In: Twelfth International Symposium on High Performance Distributed Computing (HPDC-12), pp. 48–57 (2003)

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  3. Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and CRL Profile. RFC 2459 (1999)

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Japan Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, 1-1 Asahidai Tatsunokuchi Nomi, Ishikawa, 923-1292, Japan

    Li Xin & Mizuhito Ogawa

Authors
  1. Li Xin
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  2. Mizuhito Ogawa
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Nanyang Centre for Supercomputing and Visualisation School of Mechanical and Production Engineering, Nanyang Technological University, 50 Nanyang Avenue, 639 798, Singapore

    Kim-Meow Liew

  2. School of Computer Science, The University of Adelaide,  

    Hong Shen

  3. Asia Pacific Science and Technology Center, Sun Microsystems Inc., 50 Nanyang Avenue, N3-1c-10, 639798, Singapore

    Simon See

  4. School of Computer Engineering, Nanyang Technological University, 639798, Singapore

    Wentong Cai

  5. Southwest Jiaotong University,  

    Pingzhi Fan

  6. Tohoku University ,  

    Susumu Horiguchi

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© 2004 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Xin, L., Ogawa, M. (2004). A Lightweight Mutual Authentication Based on Proxy Certificate Trust List. In: Liew, KM., Shen, H., See, S., Cai, W., Fan, P., Horiguchi, S. (eds) Parallel and Distributed Computing: Applications and Technologies. PDCAT 2004. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3320. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-30501-9_121

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-30501-9_121

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-24013-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-30501-9

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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