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Meta-game Equilibrium for Multi-agent Reinforcement Learning

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AI 2004: Advances in Artificial Intelligence (AI 2004)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNAI,volume 3339))

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Abstract

This paper proposes a multi-agent Q-learning algorithm called meta-game-Q learning that is developed from the meta-game equilibrium concept. Different from Nash equilibrium, meta-game equilibrium can achieve the optimal joint action game through deliberating its preference and predicting others’ policies in the general-sum game. A distributed negotiation algorithm is used to solve the meta-game equilibrium problem instead of using centralized linear programming algorithms. We use the repeated prisoner’s dilemma example to empirically demonstrate that the algorithm converges to meta-game equilibrium.

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© 2004 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Gao, Y., Huang, J.Z., Rong, H., Zhou, ZH. (2004). Meta-game Equilibrium for Multi-agent Reinforcement Learning. In: Webb, G.I., Yu, X. (eds) AI 2004: Advances in Artificial Intelligence. AI 2004. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 3339. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-30549-1_81

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-30549-1_81

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-24059-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-30549-1

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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